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"It is Easy to Say never again; but much harder to make it so."
-President Bill Clinton to the U.N. General Assembly,
September 21, 1999.1
I. INTRODUCTION
After the Nazis exterminated six million jews during the Holocaust,
the world community pledged "never again." The victorious Allied
powers set up an international tribunal at Nuremberg to prosecute the
Nazi leaders for their monstrous deeds.2 There was hope that the leg-
acy of Nuremberg would be the institutionalization of a judicial re-
sponse to atrocities throughout the world.
Yet, the bold international prohibitions against mass atrocities codi-
fied in the aftermath of Nuremberg withered as states systematically
failed to enforce these norms. The hope of "never again" quickly be-
came the reality of "again and again" as the world community de-
clined to take action to bring those responsible to justice when four
million people were murdered in Stalin's purges (1937-1953), five mil-
lion were annihilated in China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), two
million were butchered in Cambodia's killing fields (1975-1979),
30,000 disappeared in Argentina's Dirty War (1976-1983), 200,000
were massacred in East Timor (1975-1985), 750,000 were extermi-
nated in Uganda (1971-1987), 100,000 Kurds were gassed in Iraq
(1987-1988), and 75,000 peasants were slaughtered by death squads in
El Salvador (1980-1992).3 Richard Goldstone, the first Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, has
concluded that the failure to prosecute Pol Pot (Cambodia), Idi Amin
(Uganda), and Saddam Hussein (Iraq), among others, encouraged the
Serbs to launch their policy of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugosla-
1. Michael Kelly, Shame on Clinton for ignoring genocide in Rwanda and Sierra Leone,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2000, at A19.
2. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed thereto, Aug. 8,
1945, art. 1, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
3. See Arle Levinson, Genocide a Thriving Doctrine in 20th Century, STAR, Sept. 18, 1995, at
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via (1991-1995) and the Hutus to commit genocide in Rwanda (1994)
with the expectation that they, too, would not be held accountable for
their international crimes. 4
In 1993, the U.N. Security Council, finally freed from its cold war
paralysis, created a modern-day Nuremberg Tribunal to prosecute
those responsible for international crimes in the Yugoslavia conflict. 5
A year later, the Security Council created a second ad hoc tribunal to
prosecute those responsible for genocide in Rwanda.6 The creation of
these ad hoc tribunals fueled momentum toward the establishment of
a permanent International Criminal Court ("ICC"). On July 17, 1998,
120 States voted to approve the text of a treaty creating an ICC
designed to prosecute those accused of genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, and the most serious war crimes across the globe. 7 The ICC
treaty is likely to enter into force within the next five years.8
It is one thing to create an international institution devoted to en-
forcing international justice; it is quite another to make international
justice work. Unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal, whose orders were im-
plemented by the Allied occupation forces, the ICC will have no con-
stabulary. In the absence of a direct enforcement mechanism, the ICC
will have to rely on state cooperation and indirect means of inducing
compliance with its arrest orders and requests for judicial cooperation.
The range of enforcement measures potentially available to the ICC
include: (1) condemnation of non-cooperation by the Assembly of
State Parties or the U.N. Security Council; (2) offers of individual cash
rewards for assistance in locating and apprehending indicted war
criminals; (3) use of luring by deception to obtain custody over in-
dicted war criminals; (4) freezing the assets of indicted war criminals;
(5) offers of economic incentives to governments to induce coopera-
tion; (6) imposition of diplomatic and economic sanctions on non-co-
4. See Michael P. Scharf, The Case for A Permanent International Truth Commission, 7 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375, 398 (1997).
5. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, annexed to Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704/Annexes (1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute].
6. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., at 20, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1996).
7. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183.9 (1998)
(reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 39
(1998)) [hereinafter Rome Treaty].
8. As of January 2000, over 90 countries had signed the Rome Treaty, indicating their inten-
tion to ratify it. Sixty ratifications are necessary to bring it into force. See Rome ICC Treaty
Conference: Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart
<http://www.igc.org/icc/rome/html/ratify.htm>.
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operating governments; and (7) use of military force to effectuate
apprehension. Drawing upon the recent experience of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, this Article examines the potential usefulness of these en-
forcement measures to the ICC.
II. THE PURPOSES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
When the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 808 (1993), in
which it decided to establish the Yugoslavia Tribunal (the ICTY), 9
four of the Permanent Members of the Security Council delivered stir-
ring remarks endorsing the concept of an international judicial solu-
tion to the Balkan crisis,10 while the fifth Permanent Member, China,
merely reserved its position on the matter. An examination of these
"Explanations of Vote" sheds light on what the international commu-
nity expected to be achieved through the establishment of the ICTY,
and provides a context for assessing the problems of enforcement that
the ICTY has faced and that the ICC, in turn, is likely to encounter.
" The Delegate of France, the primary sponsor of the Resolution es-
tablishing the ICTY, stated:
Prosecuting the guilty is necessary if we are to do justice to the
victims and to the international community. Prosecuting the guilty
will also send a clear message to those who continue to commit
these crimes that they will be held responsible for their acts. And
finally, prosecuting the guilty is, for the United Nations and particu-
larly for the Security Council, a matter of doing their duty to main-
tain and restore peace.1'
" The United Kingdom Representative remarked:
There has been an outburst of anger at these shocking develop-
ments. All parties share responsibility for these breaches. We be-
lieve that the Serbs have been most culpable in these hideous
practices, but we also believe that all such actions must be con-
demned; they must be investigated; and the perpetrators must be
called to account, whoever is responsible, throughout the territory
of the former Yugoslavia.12
9. See Report of the Security-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808, at para. 28, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) (reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 157-58 (1995)).
10. See id. (presenting the record of debate leading to the adoption of Resolution 808).
11. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 9, at 163-64.
12. Id. at 167.
[Vol. 49:925
2000] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 929
* The United States Representative (Madeline Albright, now Secre-
tary of State) declared:
This will be no victor's tribunal. The only victor that will prevail
in this endeavor is the truth ....
The events in the former Yugoslavia raise the questions of
whether a State may address the rights of its minorities by eradicat-
ing those minorities to achieve ethnic purity. Bold tyrants and fear-
ful minorities are watching to see whether ethnic cleansing is a
policy the world will tolerate. If we hope to promote the spread of
freedom, or if we hope to encourage the emergence of peaceful,
multi-ethnic democracies, our answers must be a resounding "no." 13
" The Russian Representative expressed similar sentiments:
[Today's] Resolution should serve the purpose of bringing to their
senses those who are ready to sacrifice for the sake of their political
ambitions the lives and dignity of hundreds and thousands of totally
innocent people.
Nor should we forget that violations of international humanita-
rian law are also taking place in the course of other armed conflicts.
We believe the Council's adoption of today's resolution will also
serve as a serious warning to those guilty of mass crimes and fla-
grant violations of human rights in other parts of the world.' 4
As indicated in the excerpts quoted above, the Permanent Members
of the Security Council articulated six distinct justifications for the Yu-
goslavia War Crimes Tribunal. The first of these, indicated in the
French intervention, was to provide justice for the victims. As the
Tribunal's former Prosecutor Richard Goldstone noted, "the Nurem-
berg Trials played an important role in enabling the victims of the
Holocaust to obtain official acknowledgement of what befell them." 15
Such acknowledgement constitutes a partial remedy for their suffering
and a powerful catharsis that can discourage acts of retaliation. Ac-
cording to Antonio Cassese, who served as the ICTY's first President,
the "only civilized alternative to this desire for revenge is to render
justice," for otherwise "feelings of hatred and resentment seething be-
low the surface will, sooner or later, erupt and lead to renewed
violence. '"16
13. Id. at 165-66 (quoting Secretary of State Warren Christopher).
14. Id. at 169.
15. Richard J. Goldstone, Fifty Years after Nuremberg: A New International Criminal Tribunal
for Human Rights Criminals, in CONTEMPORARY GENOCIDES: CAUSES, CASES. CONSEQUENCES
215 (Albert J. Jongman ed., 1996).
16. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, at
para. 15, U.N. Doc. IT/68 (1994).
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Second, as suggested by the United Kingdom's comments, the Tri-
bunal would establish accountability for individual perpetrators. By
assigning guilt to specific perpetrators on all sides, the Tribunal would
avoid the assignment of collective guilt which had characterized the
years following World War II and in part laid the foundation for the
commission of atrocities during the Balkan conflict. "Far from being a
vehicle for revenge," Antonio Cassese explained, by individualizing
guilt in hate-mongering leaders and by disabusing people of the myth
that adversary ethnic groups bear collective responsibility for the
crimes, "the ICTY is an instrument for reconciliation."'17
Third, as the French Delegate pointed out, the operation of the Tri-
bunal would deter continued perpetration of atrocities in the Balkans.
As support for this objective, David Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador-
at-Large for War Crimes Issues, observed: "We know from experience
in Bosnia that local authorities-camp commanders and temporary lo-
cal officials-sometimes do what they can to improve the circum-
stances of those under their care once they know that the
international community will investigate and punish those who fail to
respect human rights standards."' 18 Richard Goldstone added that the
existence of the ICTY may have deterred human rights violations dur-
ing the Croatian army offensive against Serb rebels in August 1995.
"Fear of prosecution in the Hague," he believed, "led Croat authori-
ties to issue orders to their soldiers to protect Serb civilian rights when
Croatia took control of the Krajina and Western Slavonia regions of
the country."'19
The international prosecution of responsible individuals can be-
come an instrument through which respect for the rule of law is in-
stilled into the popular consciousness.20 As judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, who presided over the ICTY's first trial, succinctly put it:
"We are here to tell people that the rule of law has to be respected."' z
By broadcasting televised highlights of the trials throughout Bosnia
and Serbia, that message can get through directly to the citizenry. As
Richard Goldstone further explained, "People don't relate to statis-
tics, to generalizations. People can only relate and feel when they
hear somebody that they can identify with telling what happened to
17. Id. at para. 16.
18. David J. Scheffer, International Judicial Intervention, 102 FOREIGN POL'Y 34 (1996).
19. War Crimes Prosecutor Says Tribunal May Have Deterred Violations, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Jan. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library International News File.
20. See Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?, 20 HUM. RTS.
Q. 737, 749 (1998) [hereinafter Akhavan, Justice in the Hague].
21. William W. Home, The Real Trial of the Century, AM. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 5.
[Vol. 49:925
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them. That's why the public broadcasts of the Tribunal's cases can
have a strong deterrent effect. '22
Fourth, according to the French Delegate, the Tribunal's activities
would facilitate restoration of peace in the Balkans. Through its pros-
ecutions, the Tribunal would promote the dismantling of the institu-
tions and a discrediting of the leaders that encouraged, enabled, and
carried out the commission of humanitarian crimes. There would be
particular benefit to laying bare to Serbs unscathed in Belgrade the
ghastly consequences of blood-curdling nationalistic rhetoric. Even
for those who support Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, "it will be much more diffi-
cult to dismiss live testimony given under oath than simple newspaper
reports," the Tribunal's Deputy Prosecutor, Graham Blewitt points
out. "The testimony will send a reminder in a very dramatic way that
these crimes were horrendous. '23
Fifth, as the U.S. Representative remarked, the Tribunal would de-
velop an historic record for a conflict in which distortion of the truth
has been an essential ingredient of the ethnic violence. If, to para-
phrase George Santayana, a society is condemned to repeat its mis-
takes when it has not learned the lessons of the past, then a reliable
record of those mistakes must be established in order to prevent their
recurrence. Michael Ignatieff recognizes that "[tihe great virtue of
legal proceedings is that their evidentiary rules confer legitimacy on
otherwise contestable facts. In this sense, war crimes trials make it
more difficult for societies to take refuge in denial-the trials do assist
the process of uncovering the truth. ' 24 The Chief Prosecutor at Nu-
remberg, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, underscored the
logic of this proposition when he reported to President Truman that
one of the most important legacies of the Nuremberg trials following
World War II was that they documented the Nazi atrocities "with such
authenticity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial
of these crimes in the future and no tradition of martyrdom of the
Nazi leaders can arise among informed people. '25 Similarly, in prov-
ing the existence of crimes against humanity and genocide, the Yugo-
slavia Tribunal would generate a comprehensive record of the nature
22. Interview with Justice Richard Goldstone, Brussels, Belgium (July 20, 1996).
23. Interview with Graham Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, The Hague, Netherlands (July 25, 1996).
24. Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, in INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (Sept./Oct. 1996) (reprinted
in 294 HARPER'S MAG. 15, 15 (March 1997)).
25. Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United
States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, June 7, 1945 (reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L.
178, 184 (Supp. 1945)).
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and extent of violations in the Balkans, how they were planned and
executed, the fate of individual victims, who gave the orders and who
carried them out. By carefully proving these facts one witness at a
time in the face of vigilant cross-examination by distinguished defense
counsel, the international trials would produce a definitive account
that can pierce the distortions generated by official propaganda, en-
dure the test of time, and resist the forces of revisionism.
Finally, as both the United States and Russia stressed, the Tribunal
would serve as a deterrent to perpetration of atrocities elsewhere.
The punishment of crimes committed in the Balkans would send the
message, both to potential aggressors and vulnerable minorities, that
the international community will not allow atrocities to be committed
with impunity. According to Richard Goldstone,
"[i]f people in leadership positions know there's an international
court out there, that there's an international prosecutor, and that
the international community is going to act as an international po-
lice force, I just cannot believe that they aren't going to think twice
as to the consequences. Until now, they haven't had to. There's
been no enforcement mechanism at all." 26
Payam Akhavan of the staff of the ICTY contends that "the delib-
erations of the Security Council indicate that the complementarity of
peace and justice was considered and accepted by virtually all member
states. ' 27 But other commentators have maintained that "nothing
could be further from the truth than to say that there was a consensus
on the compatibility between peace and legal justice. '28 There was
widespread belief that questionable motives lurked behind the Secur-
ity Council's articulated rationales for the Tribunal. Several commen-
tators argued that the Council's justifications were merely a pretense,
calculated to mask the reluctance of the Western powers to take reso-
lute action to repress the policy of ethnic cleansing. 29 According to
the Ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United Nations,
Muhamed Sacirbey, "[jiustice was held out, in reality, as an alternative
to real immediate measures to confront the crime or the criminals. '30
26. Goldstone Interview, supra note 22.
27. Payham Akhavan, The Yugoslavia Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agreement
and Beyond, 18 HuM. Rrs. Q. 259, 263 (1996) [hereinafter Akhavan, The Yugoslavia Tribunal].
28. David P. Forsythe, International Criminal Courts: A Political View, 15 NETHERLANDS Q.
HUM. RTs. 5, 9 (1997) [hereinafter Forsythe, International Criminal Courts].
29. See Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 20, at 9.
30. Muhamed Sacirbey, in No PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 54 (1997).
[Vol. 49:925
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Others believed the Tribunal would be used as a "bargaining chip," to
be bartered away at the negotiating table. 31
Professor David Forsythe of the University of Nebraska has written
that, for the United States, the creation of the Tribunal was an instru-
ment for pacifying critics that would generate "the appearance of ac-
tion against gross violations of human rights, but without great
sacrifice of outsiders' blood or treasure. ' 32 In addition to the public
relations benefit, the United States recognized that even without
bringing a single perpetrator to trial, an international indictment and
arrest warrant could serve to isolate offending leaders diplomatically,
strengthen the hand of domestic rivals, and fortify the international
political will to expand economic sanctions or approve airstrikes. 33
According to Forsythe, the United Kingdom considered the Tribu-
nal an impediment to a negotiated peace, but "knew that opposing
criminal prosecution could be politically awkward" and therefore
played a "double diplomatic game of public endorsement but private
opposition. ' 34 China and Russia, he suggests, were opposed to the
creation of the Tribunal but "for reasons of deference to a hegemonic
U.S., or to deflect criticism from their own human rights record...
chose not to vigorously contest an ad hoc court" of limited
jurisdiction. 35
The test of whether the international community intended the
ICTY to achieve the goals of international justice articulated by its
founders (achieving accountability, truth telling, deterrence, and rec-
onciliation), or rather to serve merely as a "Potempkin Court" as For-
sythe and Sacirbey suggest, was whether the Tribunal would be given
the resources and support necessary to effectively accomplish its
mission.
III. PAYING THE PRICE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The first thing needed to enforce international justice is money-a
substantial amount of it. If done right, international justice is ex-
tremely expensive. Erecting and administering courtrooms, offices,
and jails; paying the salaries of judges, prosecutors, defense counsel,
31. See Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 500, 503-04
(1994).
32. David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5
CRiM. L.F. 401 (1994) [hereinafter Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal].
33. See Michael P. Scharf, The Politics Behind U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal
Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 97, 99 (1999).
34. Forsythe, International Criminal Courts, supra note 28, at 8.
35. Id.
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investigators, translators, secretaries, and security guards; providing
transportation, housing, and protection for witnesses; and conducting
complex trials in multiple languages-can cost hundreds of millions of
dollars annually.36
To put the costs of international justice in perspective, one must
recall that the ICTY was seeking to prosecute political and military
leaders responsible for the murder and torture of hundreds of
thousands of victims. The closest domestic analogue is the trial of ma-
jor mob figures or terrorists, which in the United States have cost as
much as $70 million for a single trial. 37
While the expenses of international justice might seem reasonable
when compared to that of domestic justice in the United States, as a
creature of the Security Council, the ICTY was funded out of the
budget of the United Nations. In seeking funding, the ICTY encoun-
tered problems of competing institutional interests within the U.N.
system, and interference from entirely unrelated issues, most notably
the non-payment of United States dues, which pushed the United Na-
tions to the verge of bankruptcy.38
As a result, during its first several years, the ICTY was remarkably
underfunded. Instead of the $32.6 million the Secretary-General re-
quested to fund the International Tribunal for its first year of opera-
tion (1994),39 the General Assembly granted a provisional budget of
one third that amount.40 During its second year of operation (1995),
the General Assembly had approved a bare-bones $32 million budget
which would cover only the cost of renting the west wing of the Aegon
building in The Hague, rental and contracting of equipment and serv-
ices, and salaries and expenses for a staff of 108 (eleven judges,
nineteen prosecutors, twenty-three investigators, ten defense counsel,
ten members of the Registry, twelve clerical staff, twelve security
36. The ICTY's budget for 1999 was $90 million. U.S. General Accounting Office Report,
Former Yugoslavia-War Crimes Tribunal's Workload Exceeds Capacity, GAO/NSIAD-98-134,
June 2, 1998 [hereinafter Workload Exceeds Capacity].
37. "The 1992 trial of New York mob boss John Gotti cost the U.S. Government $75 million
and the 1997 trial of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh cost the U.S. Government $50
million." VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 683 (1998).
38. See Michael P. Scharf & Tamara Shaw, International Institutions, 33 INT'L LAW. 567, 567-70
(1999).
39. See Report of the Secretary-General as Requested by the General Assembly in Resolution
47/235, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C5/48/44/Add.1 (1994) [hereinafter Resolution 47/235].
40. See G.A. Res. 48/241, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 30, U.N. Doc. (1994).
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guards, and twenty-eight interpreters). 41 In all, 75% of the funds
budgeted were allocated for the judges, administration, and over-
head.42 Less than 2% of the total was "budgeted for the critical work
of tracking down witnesses, obtaining and translating their accounts,
exhuming mass graves and conducting post-mortems, [sic] and provid-
ing medical and forensic expertise. '' 43 No funds at all were budgeted
for witness protection, counseling, and security.
This 1995 budget betrayed an extraordinary ignorance of the task
that faced the prosecution. According to Richard Goldstone's esti-
mates, the average case before the Tribunal would require statements
from 100 victims or witnesses, each averaging between twenty and
thirty-five pages; an additional 400 pages of documents (military maps
and charts); over 100 photographs (autopsies and scene of the crime);
between twenty and forty video tapes; twenty audio tapes; physical
evidence (weapons; uniforms, etc.), and exhumation examination re-
ports. Between sixty and eighty witnesses may have to attend each
actual trial.44
To make matters worse, in 1995 the United Nations faced a funding
crisis that pushed it to the brink of insolvency, with significant conse-
quences for the ICTY. U.N. members owed the organization $3.1 bil-
lion, with more than half that amount owed by the United States.
Under a scale of assessments agreed to in the early years of the Or-
ganization, the United States is obligated to pay 25% of the United
Nations' regular budget and 30% of its peacekeeping budget. During
the Reagan Administration, the United States began to fall behind in
its payments, amassing a huge debt to the United Nations. The Bush
Administration had adopted a five year repayment plan, but in 1994
Congress reneged, and by 1995 the United States was $1.6 billion in
arrears to the United Nations.45
With the United Nations literally running out of cash, the Secreta-
riat slowed the supply of funds to the ICTY to a trickle. As a conse-
quence, the Office of the Prosecutor was prevented from spending
41. See Resolution 47/235, supra note 39 (revised cost estimates); Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral as Requested by the General Assembly in Resolution 47/235, U.N. Doc. A/C5/48/44 (1993)
(original estimate).
42. See Prepared Testimony of Thomas S. Warrick, Special Counsel, Coalition for International
Justice Before the House Committee On International Operations and Human Rights, Re: United
Nations Support For the Yugoslavia and Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal, Federal News Service,
Oct. 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service File [hereinafter Warrick
Testimony].
43. Prosecute Bosnia's War Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1995, at A18.
44. See lAIN GUEST, ON TRIAL: THE UNITED NATIONS, WAR CRIMES AND THE FORMER YU-
GOSLAVIA 139-40 (1995).
45. See WASH. WKLY. REP., Mar. 18, 1996.
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money to send investigators into the field to investigate the 1995 mas-
sacre of 8,000 civilians at the U.N. "safe area" of Srebrenica. The Of-
fice was also precluded from recruiting lawyers, or renewing contracts
of current personnel as a result of restrictions on United Nations
agencies imposed by the Secretary-General in the face of the fiscal
crisis. Evidence already gathered from refugee interviews began to
pile up unsifted and untranslated. 46 And the Tribunal's first trial in-
volving a Serb prison camp guard captured in Germany, which was
scheduled to begin in November 1995, was postponed until May 6,
1996, for want of $78,000 for expenses for defense counsel and
investigators. 47
The Tribunal's Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, normally the con-
summate team player, decided the time had come to take his case to
the international press. "If these restrictions continue, they will...
'render unconscious the Yugoslav tribunal,"' Goldstone told the inter-
national press.48 "The criminal justice system cannot conduct itself if
resources are turned on and off," he added. 49 Joining Goldstone's
public plea, the Tribunal's President, Judge Antonio Cassese told the
General Assembly, "[a]ll these undertakings are costly-of that there
is no doubt; but if the United Nations wants to hear the voice of jus-
tice speak loudly and clearly, then the Member States must be willing
to pay the price."'50
This blunt message apparently had its desired effect. Despite its
continuing budget difficulties, the United Nations approved a $35 mil-
lion budget for the Tribunal in 1996, a $48 million budget in 1997, a
$70 million budget in 1998, and a $94 million budget in 1999.51 These
numbers are extraordinary given the fact that the overall U.N. budget
has been frozen since 1994 at the urging of the United States, but they
have not proven sufficient for the expensive mission of the ICTY.
In 1998, the U.S. Government Accounting Office ("GAO") con-
ducted a study of the ICTY which concluded that, even with its newly
expanded budget, the Tribunal "does not have the capacity to handle
46. See Marlise Simons, Bosnian Rapes Go Untried by U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at A12.
47. See Warrick Testimony, supra note 42.
48. Raymond Bonner, U.N. Fiscal Woes Are Said to Threaten War Crime Tribunals, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A8.
49. Id.
50. Remarks of Antonio Cassese, 52nd Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General As-
sembly, at 3, U.N. Doe. A/50/PV.52 (1995).
51. See Bulletin of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, No. 18
<http://www.un.org/icty/BL/18perse.htm>. These figures have been augmented by in-kind con-
tributions of equipment and loaned personnel (approximately 50 a year), and voluntary cash
contributions from 28 countries and organizations. See Workload Exceeds Capacity, supra note
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its current workload [with over 30 indictees in custody], and the prob-
lem is likely to get worse. '52 The GAO noted that the Tribunal re-
ceives new information at the rate of 20,000 pages of documents a
month, which it has been unable to process. Altogether, the backlog
of evidence potentially "vital to ongoing or planned investigations"
includes "over 800,000 pages of documents, about 9,000 photographs,
and so much unviewed videotape we estimate it would take one per-
son over two years to watch. ' 53 The GAO added that the Tribunal
could not provide investigators to conduct work in Kosovo without
seriously hampering ongoing investigations and trial preparations. 54
The GAO also pointed out that the Tribunal's trial backlog of cases
raised fair trial concerns, as indictees have to wait for up to three
years before their trials can begin.55
In sum, though its financial situation has steadily improved, the
ICTY has been consistently underfunded by the United Nations, hin-
dering its ability to conduct investigations and sift through evidence in
its possession, and delaying trials at the expense of due process. Rich-
ard Goldstone has rationalized that "[t]he Tribunal has been the child
of an insolvent parent, with all the consequences that has."'56 If that is
the case, the financial prospects of the ICC are likely to be even more
precarious. According to Article 115 of the Rome Statute, the ICC is
to be funded from assessed contributions made by State Parties, as
well as funds provided by the United Nations when a case is referred
to the ICC by the Security Council. 57 Since the State Parties to the
Rome Statute will be substantially fewer in number than the members
of the United Nations and may not include many of the nations which
pay the largest percentages to the U.N. budget, the pool of resources
available to the ICC will be much more limited than those available to
the ICTY. This will mean that the ICC, like the ICTY, will likely
experience persistent financial difficulties which will negatively effect,
and may ultimately thwart, its mission.
52. Workload Exceeds Capacity, supra note 36, at 9.
53. Id. at 17-18.
54. See id. at 14.
55. See id. at 10-11, 18-19.
56. Goldstone Interview, supra note 22 (quoted in MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 84
(1997)).
57. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 115.
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IV. ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE THROUGH
FINANCIAL INDUCEMENTS
This section examines the potential uses of financial inducement as
a means of enforcing international criminal justice. As described be-
low, financial inducement can be used as a stick (as with the threat or
imposition of trade embargoes and the freezing of assets), or as a car-
rot (as with the conditional promise of reconstruction aid or the offer
of "rewards").
A. Security Council Sanctions
Article 41 of the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council to
impose a range of sanctions in an effort to restore international peace
and security, and Article 25 requires the members of the United Na-
tions to comply with Security Council-imposed sanctions.58 The expe-
rience of the ICTY indicates the difficulties of using economic
sanctions as a means to empower an international criminal court.
Prior to the creation of the ICTY, on May 30, 1992, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 757, imposing sweeping economic sanc-
tions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
("the FRY") and the Bosnian Serb entity known as Republika Srpska
to punish them for committing atrocities in Bosnia.59 The sanctions
regime established by this resolution, however, was littered with loop-
holes and contained no enforcement mechanisms. 60 As Serb atrocities
continued unabated, the sanctions were later strengthened through
the adoption of Security Council Resolution 787 in November 199261
and Security Council Resolution 820 in April 1993.62
Collectively, these resolutions imposed an embargo on imports to
and from the FRY and Bosnian Serb entity, prohibited air flights to
and from the FRY, called upon States to seize FRY-registered vessels
and vehicles, froze the assets of the FRY government, and prevented
representatives of the FRY from participating in international sport-
ing events.63 Most importantly, Resolution 820 authorized a multilat-
eral interdiction force to enforce the sanctions on the Adriatic Sea,
effectively imposing a naval blockade against the FRY.64 On the land,
58. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25, 41.
59. See S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 3082d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
60. See Michael P. Scharf & Joshua L. Dorosin, Interpreting UN Sanctions: The Rulings and
Role of the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 771, 807-10 (1993).
61. S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (1992).
62. S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993).
63. See Scharf & Dorosin, supra note 60, at 796-811.
64. See S.C. Res. 820.
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enforcement of the sanctions was monitored by NATO Sanctions
Assistance Missions, located on the borders of the front-line states.
The Security Council made the phased lifting of sanctions conditional
on the agreement of the leaders of the FRY and Bosnian Serbs to the
proposed European Union-United Nations peace plan65 and, after the
adoption of Resolution 827, on their cooperation with the ICTY.
66
Although the FRY asserted that its constitution prohibited the sur-
render of Serb nationals to the ICTY and that it otherwise lacked the
necessary domestic legislation to comply with the Tribunal's orders,
Resolution 827 specifically required all States to take any measures
necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the
Resolution. Under international law, a State has a duty to comply
with its international legal obligations, including binding Chapter VII
Security Council Resolutions, which take precedence over all domes-
tic legal obligations. A State may not legitimately assert that it is un-
able to fulfill its international legal obligations on the basis that it is
prohibited from doing so by domestic legislation, or that it lacks the
necessary domestic authority. 67
The sanctions were not immediately effective, but by 1994, they
were beginning to have a significant impact on the FRY's economy.
At that time, professor David Forsythe accurately predicted that if
fighting in Bosnia were to cease, "outside interest in sanctions on
states for not extraditing war criminals-sanctions that hurt the sanc-
tioning states as well-would decline markedly. ' 68 Thus, following
the initialling of the Dayton Peace Agreement on November 21, 1995,
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1022, whereby it decided to
suspend "indefinitely with immediate effect" the economic sanctions
which it had imposed against the FRY and Republika Srpska begin-
ning in 1992.69 The representative of the United Kingdom explained
the decision to lift sanctions in the following terms:
In August last year, Belgrade took a significant step in deciding to
close its border with the Bosnian Serbs until they were prepared to
accept a negotiated settlement. This Council rightly responded by
granting a limited package of sanctions relief, conditional on the
border remaining closed. The existence of this Peace Agreement is
the clearest possible vindication of the Council's use of economic
65. See id.
66. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); David Ottaway,
U.S. Warns Serbs on War Trials, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1994, at A19.
67. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25; VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, May 23,
1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 27.
68. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal, supra note 32, at 416.
69. S.C. Res. 1022, U.N. SCOR, 359th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1022 (1995).
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sanctions to bring about change. It is therefore right that this Coun-
cil should now reward Belgrade's contribution to the successful out-
come of the Dayton negotiations by granting very substantial
sanctions relief.70
Resolution 1022 contained a potentially important provision for the
reintroduction of economic sanctions in the event of noncompliance
with the Dayton Agreement. Paragraph 3 of the resolution provided:
if at any time, with regard to a matter within the scope of their re-
spective mandates and after joint consultation if appropriate, either
the High Representative [for civilian implementation] . . . or the
commander of the international force . . . informs the Council via
the Secretary-General that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or
the Bosnian Serb authorities are failing significantly to meet their
obligations under the Peace Agreement, the suspension [of eco-
nomic sanctions] shall terminate on the fifth day following the
Council's receipt of such a report, unless the Council decides other-
wise taking into consideration the nature of the non-compliance. 71
Consequently, either High Representative for Civilian Implementa-
tion Carl Bildt, or IFOR commander Admiral Leighton Smith could
trigger automatic reimposition of sanctions in the event of Serb non-
compliance with the Dayton mandates.
The Dayton Accords contained several provisions requiring the par-
ties to cooperate with the Yugoslav Tribunal. Article IX of the Gen-
eral Framework Agreement and Article XIII(4) of the Agreement on
Human Rights required the parties thereto (Bosnia, Croatia, and the
FRY) to cooperate fully with and give unrestricted access to the Yugo-
slav Tribunal, and this requirement was extended to the Republika
Srpska by Article IV of the Agreement on Civilian Implementation.
Moreover, Article IX(1) of the new Constitution of Bosnia prohibited
any person who has been indicted by and has failed to comply with an
order to appear before the Tribunal from holding any appointive, elec-
tive, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia. In addition, it
required all competent authorities in Bosnia to cooperate with and to
grant unrestricted access to the Tribunal. Referring to these obliga-
tions, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright
warned:
My Government again stresses the importance of every country's
obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal and to comply with its
orders. Unless they comply with their obligations, the parties to the
conflict cannot expect to reap the benefits of peace, [and] ensure
the permanent easing of economic sanctions .... 72
70. U.N. SCOR, 3595th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3595 (1995).
71. S.C. Res. 1022, at 2.
72. U.N. SCOR, 3607th mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3607 (1995).
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On paper, Resolution 1022 seemed to create an ideal mechanism
for inducing cooperation with the ICTY. By making a report from
Carl Bildt or Leighton Smith the automatic trigger, the resolution
would avoid the need to seek Security Council approval for reimposi-
tion of sanctions in the event the FRY or Bosnian Serbs breached
their obligations under the Dayton Accords, thus depoliticizing the
process (and circumventing an almost certain Russian veto).
But in practice, there were three problems with the trigger mecha-
nism. First, rather than providing for an incremental reimposition of
sanctions, it made reimposition an all-or-nothing proposition, which
would thus be psychologically difficult for Bildt or Smith to employ.
Second, the resolution did not specifically define the term "significant
failure" to include refusal to surrender indicted persons to the Tribu-
nal, although that was the understanding of the United States and
other members of the Council.73 The third problem was that the trig-
ger mechanism was placed in the hands of the two officials who, given
their personalities and backgrounds, were least likely to use it. Carl
Bildt, the leader of the opposition in the Swedish Parliament, was the
European Union's mediator in the last phase of the Bosnian conflict.
As mediator, Bildt had a reputation for yielding to the Bosnian Serb
aggressors. 74 He came under criticism for opposing NATO air strikes
when the Bosnian Serbs murdered thousands of civilians in the "safe
area" of Srebrenica, and for refusing to reproach the Serbs for their
actions at Srebrenica until three months after the massacre. 75 As dis-
cussed below, Admiral Smith for his part was no fan of the ICTY and
had a penchant for narrowly interpreting the provisions of Security
Council resolutions concerning the Tribunal.
76
Despite the fact that the preamble of Resolution 1022 noted that
"compliance with the requests and orders of the International Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia constitutes an essential aspect of imple-
menting the Peace Agreement," Carl Bildt and Admiral Smith did not
view the refusal to arrest or transfer indicted persons to the Tribunal,
or the continued presence of such persons in official positions in the
Republika Srpska as a "significant failure" to meet the obligations
under the Dayton Agreement within the meaning of Resolution 1022.
Thus, no triggering report to the Security Council was forthcoming
from either Bildt or Smith when the Tribunal informed them that the
73. See id.
74. See Anthony Lewis, Early Signs of Progress in Bosnia Are Far from Encouraging, SEAT-
TLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 12, 1995, at A16, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library News File.
75. See id.
76. See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR 339 (1998).
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FRY and Republika Srpska had refused to comply with the Tribunal's
arrest warrants and that a number of persons indicted by the Tribunal
continued to hold official positions in Prijedor and Foca.77 In May of
1996, Bildt warned the FRY that its failure to cooperate with the Tri-
bunal risked reimposition of the sanctions, but he never followed this
up with any action. 78
Then, over the strong objections of Alija Izetbegovic (the President
of Bosnia's new coalition government), the Ministers of the Contact
Group on Bosnia (Germany, the United States, France, the United
Kingdom, and Russia) decided to recommend that the Security Coun-
cil make the suspension of sanctions permanent. 79 This action was
seen as an appropriate reward to the FRY for formally recognizing the
new Bosnian Government and for supporting democratic elections in
Bosnia in September 1996. Consequently, on October 1, 1996, the Se-
curity Council adopted Resolution 1074, permanently terminating the
Yugoslav sanctions and disbanding the Sanctions Committee, 80 thus
giving away potentially the most effective mechanism for pressuring
the Serbs to surrender indicted persons to the Yugoslav Tribunal.
Although Resolution 1074 warned that the Council would "consider
the imposition of measures if any party fails significantly to meet its
obligations under the Peace Agreement," 81 it was clear that the Coun-
cil would never be able to muster the necessary votes among the per-
manent members to reimpose such sweeping sanctions against the
77. See Third Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
at paras. 167-69, U.N. Doc. S/1996/665 (1996) [hereinafter Third Annual Report]. Following
Rule 61 hearings in the cases of Nikolic, Karadzic and Mladic, and Rajic, the President of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal notified the Security Council of the refusal of the Republika Srpska, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Croatia, respectively, to surrender the accused to the Tribu-
nal. See Letter from the President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia to the President of the Security Council, Oct. 31, 1995, U.N. Doc. S/1995/
910 (1995) (Nikolic case); Letter dated July 11, 1996from the President of the International Tribu-
nal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanita-
rian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/19961556 (1996) (Karadzic and Mladic case); Let-
ter dated Sept. 16, 1996 from the President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/19961763 (1996) (Rajic case).
78. See Bildt Urges Bosnian Serb War Criminals Be Turned Over, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGEN-
TUR, May 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library International News File.
79. John M. Gochko, U.N. Sanctions Against Bosnia to Be Lifted; Election Certification by
Council Expected, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1996, at A31.
80. See S.C. Res. 1074, U.N. SCOR, 3700th mtg. at paras. 2 and 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1074
(1996).
81. Id. at para. 5.
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FRY. The sanctions on Yugoslavia cost Russia about $2 billion, and
immediately after the lifting of the sanctions, Russia moved to restore
its economic and financial ties to the FRY.82 Thus, it should have
come as no surprise that in 1996 when the Yugoslav Tribunal reported
that the FRY had repeatedly refused to comply with the orders of the
Tribunal, 83 the Security Council condemned the failure to arrest and
transfer the individuals involved, but it declined to reimpose any sort
of sanctions to enforce compliance. 84 Graham Blewitt, the Tribunal's
Deputy Prosecutor, lamented that the Security Council's position sent
a signal to the Serbs that there would be no consequences for non-
compliance with the Tribunal's orders, thereby encouraging their con-
tinued refusal to cooperate.85
In light of the Security Council's inaction, on February 9, 1999, the
FRY formally announced that it would never extradite Mile Mrksic,
Veselin Sljivancanin and Mirslav Radic, the three Serb officers whose
surrender was requested on charges relating to their alleged involve-
ment in the killing of 260 unarmed men at Ovcara farm near Vukovar
in 1991.86 Seven months later, during her departing speech, the
ICTY's outgoing chief judge, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, derided the
Security Council for ignoring its responsibility to compel Serbia and
Croatia to turn over suspected war criminals. McDonald explained
how she had made two personal appeals and four more in writing to
the Security Council to compel the Serbian leadership to turn over the
three Serbs, known as "the Vukovar Three," who are wanted for war
crimes in Croatia. In response, she said, "the Council has done
nothing. '87
This does not bode well for the ICC's enforcement regime. When
the ICC prosecutes on the basis of a referral by a State Party88 or
82. See Laurie A. Cohen, Application of the Realist and Liberal Perspectives to the Implemen-
tation of War Crimes Trials: Case Studies of Nuremberg and Bosnia, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR.
AFF. 113, 153 (1997).
83. Following Rule 61 hearings in the cases of Nikolic, Karadzic and Mladic, and Rajic, the
President of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has notified the Security Council of the refusal of the
Republika Srpska, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Croatia, respectively, to surrender
the accused to the Tribunal. See supra note 77.
84. See Daphna Shraga & Ralph Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 7
EUR. J. INT'L L. 501, 517 (1996).
85. See Interview with Graham Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Hague, Netherlands (Aug. 11, 1998).
86. See Croatia Arrests Croatian Serbs Suspected of War Crimes While Yugoslavia Rejects War
Crime Tribunal Extradition Requests, 15 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT RPTR. 128 (1999).
87. Colum Lynch, Departing War Crimes Tribunal Chief Assails U.N. Inaction, WASH. POST,
Nov. 9, 1999, at A26.
88. See Rome Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 14.
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where the Prosecutor initiates the investigation,89 the ICC will have to
rely on the voluntary cooperation of states for the surrender of in-
dicted persons and the provision of evidence. 90 The experience of the
ICTY suggests that states will frequently refuse to provide such coop-
eration despite their clear treaty obligations to comply with the Tribu-
nal's orders. The ICC's only recourse in such a situation is to make a
finding that the state has failed to cooperate and then refer the matter
to the Assembly of States Parties. 91 The Assembly's only enforce-
ment mechanism is the issuance of a statement condemning the failure
to cooperate-which is unlikely to have much effect.
In contrast, where the ICC acts on a referral by the Security Coun-
cil,92 in theory the potential for enforcing the ICC's orders would be
much greater. Even states that are not party to the Rome Treaty
would be bound to comply with the ICC's orders pursuant to their
obligations under Article 25 of the U.N. Charter. If they fail to com-
ply with this obligation, the ICC can refer the matter to the Security
Council for enforcement through the imposition of sanctions. 93 But
the experience of the ICTY indicates that, even in the most egregious
of situations, the Security Council is unlikely to impose sanctions in
the event of non-cooperation with the ICC, especially where the tar-
get state's trading partners include one or more of the Permanent
Members of the Council which wield a veto.
B. Targeting Specific Individuals: Freezing of Assets
As mentioned above, one of the Security Council sanctions initially
imposed on the FRY was the freezing of all government assets in for-
eign banks. In the context of the United Nations' efforts to dislodge
the military regime from Haiti in 1993, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 841, which required U.N. member states to freeze the as-
sets located within their jurisdiction of known supporters of the mili-
tary regime.94 This was the first time the Security Council acted under
Article 41 of the U.N. Charter to freeze the assets of private individu-
als rather than a government.
Drawing upon the Haiti precedent, the author of this Article pro-
posed in a book published in 1998 that the Security Council should
89. See id. at art. 15.
90. The parties to the Rome Treaty would have a treaty obligation to comply with the ICC's
orders, but no obligation would apply to non-state parties. See id. at art. 86.
91. See id. at art. 87(7).
92. See id. at art. 13.
93. See id. at art. 87(7).
94. See S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 3238th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993).
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pass a resolution requiring states to seize and freeze the assets of any
person subject to an international arrest warrant who refuses to sur-
render to the ICTY. 95 Such action "would (1) further isolate persons
indicted by the International Tribunal, (2) serve as an effective penalty
even if such persons evade justice, and (3) induce such persons to sur-
render themselves to the International Tribunal. '96 Radovan
Karadzic, in particular, is said to be protected by a small mercenary
force which he pays for through funds on deposit in Cyprus. 97 Tying
up Karadzic's offshore funds, therefore, would greatly facilitate his
capture.
Because these sanctions would be targeted at specific individuals,
not governments, it would seem to be easier to gain support of the
members of the Security Council for such a measure. 98 However,
David Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues,
later informed the author that he had circulated an assets freeze pro-
posal along the lines suggested to the members of the Security Coun-
cil, and had encountered stiff opposition to the idea.
When the ICTY indicted Slobodan Milosevic and four other FRY
officials on May 27, 1999, the Office of the Prosecutor of the Yugoslav
Tribunal discovered a creative way to circumvent the problem of Se-
curity Council recalcitrance. Pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Tribu-
nal's Statute, the Milosevic indictment directed states to provisionally
freeze any assets of the accused located in their territories until the
accused are taken into custody.99
The authority cited for this action, Article 19 of the Tribunal's Stat-
ute, merely provides that "upon confirmation of an indictment, the
judge may, at the request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and
warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer of persons,
and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of the
trial."100 While it was not originally envisaged that Article 19 would
be used as the basis for the freezing of the accused's assets, the Prose-
cutor explained that the decision to request such an order "was taken
in light of the consistent non-cooperation of the FRY with the Tribu-
95. See MARSHALL FREEMAN HARRIS ET AL., MAKING JUSTICE WORK 50 (1998).
96. Id.
97. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Secret Meetings Foiled Karadzic Capture Plan; U.S. Says French Jeop-
ardized Mission, WASH. PosT, Apr. 23, 1998, at A32.
98. See id.
99. See ICTY Press Release, President Milosevic and Four Other Senior FRY Officials Indicted
for Murder, Persecution and Deportation in Kosovo, at 3, U.N. Doc. JL/PIU/403-E (1999) [here-
inafter ICTY Press Release].
100. ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 19.
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nal and the possibility that such assets be used to evade arrest." 10 1
Because the orders of the Tribunal are "considered to be the applica-
tion of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations," the Tribunal's order theoretically has the
equivalent force of law of a binding Security Council Resolution.10 2
While the assets freeze ordered by the Yugoslav Tribunal may have
rankled some of the members of the Security Council who had op-
posed Ambassador Scheffer's proposal the year before, the order was
timed to avoid any serious challenge. A month earlier, the European
Union foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg had decided to
freeze the assets of Milosevic and his core associates in the territory of
EU countries. 10 3 Like Radovan Karadzic, Milosevic's fortune is re-
ported to be held in Cypriot banks. Cyprus, which is one of five coun-
tries earmarked for accelerated accession to the European Union,
decided to cooperate in the assets freeze. 10 4 For its part, the United
States welcomed the decision of the Yugoslav Tribunal to require the
freezing of the assets of the indicted Serb officials, and announced that
they had been pronounced "Specially Designated Nationals" whose
property would be blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13088.105
Although the ICTY has not made the freezing of assets of indicted
war criminals a general policy beyond the Milosevic indictment,
through an unexpected legal interpretation, the Tribunal has managed
to equip itself with a powerful new financial tool to induce compliance
with its arrest warrants. Compared to other forms of financial induce-
ment such as imposition of economic sanctions and conditionality of
reconstruction aid-which hurt the population at large, as well as the
target country's trading partners-freezing the assets of indicted war
criminals is a precision tool for promoting justice. It is a tool of great
potential value to the ICC, which would be available where its juris-
diction is triggered by the Security Council.
C. Conditional Assistance
Sanctions are punitive in nature and are politically difficult to im-
pose and enforce. Conditionality of economic assistance, on the other
hand, creates a positive incentive for a particular course of conduct
and does not require action by the Security Council.
101. ICTY Press Release, supra note 99, at 3.
102. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 9, at para. 126.
103. See Cyprus Vows to Honour Tighter EU Sanctions on Yugoslavia, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Apr. 27, 1999, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library International News File.
104. See id.
105. See U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing (James Rubin), May 28, 1999.
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Annually from 1996 to 1999, dozens of countries and international
organizations met for a Bosnian aid summit to determine the amount
and modalities of reconstruction assistance they would provide post-
conflict Bosnia. The top priority of the effort, however, was not in-
ducing the parties to the Yugoslav conflict to cooperate with the Inter-
national Tribunal, but rather to create a stable economy in which
people could find work in order to allow for the return to Bosnia of
1.7 million refugees and displaced persons. 10 6
At the 1996 London Summit, donor nations vowed to increase pres-
sure on authorities in the former Yugoslavia who had failed to extra-
dite indicted war criminals. The donor nations issued a warning that
reconstruction aid would be closely linked to cooperation with the Yu-
goslav Tribunal. As the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
warned: "It is a simple proposition, but a critical one. The benefits of
economic and financial assistance should not go to those who thwart
the will of this Council's requirement to cooperate with the war crimes
Tribunal." 0 7
Despite this warning, no action was taken to suspend the hundreds
of millions of dollars in aid earmarked for the Republika Srpska when
its President, Biljana Plavsic, in a letter addressed to the U.N. Secre-
tary-General in early January 1997, stated that there will be no coop-
eration with the ICTY, and warned that the arrest of indicted Bosnian
Serbs would cause "massive civil and military unrest." 10 8 A spokes-
man for the office of the Civilian High Representative, entrusted with
the task of implementing the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords,
expressed disapproval of Plavsic's letter, but indicated that "it makes
no difference ... on the flow of reconstruction aid." 10 9
The initial failure to actually condition aid reflected the prevailing
view that the withholding of funds until a party complies with its obli-
gation to cooperate with the Tribunal would undercut the goal of
rapid economic revival and the positive incentive of commercial gain
to entice nationalist groups to abandon their separatist interests. 110 It
was felt that steps to impose international economic isolation would
only work in favor of extremists who have an interest in perpetuating
106. See Stephane Barbier, Bosnia to Get 1.25 Billion Dollars in Aid in 1998, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, May 8, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library International News File.
107. U.N. SCOR, 3607th mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3607 (1995).
108. AP, Won't give up war crimes suspects, Bosnian Serb president tells U.N., TORONTO STAR,
Jan. 9, 1997, at A14.
109. M2, Presswire, Press Briefing Transcript for Jan. 10, 1997, Jan. 13, 1997, available in
LEXIS, newsfile.
110. See Susan L. Woodward, Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-Dayton
Primer and Memorandum of Warning, BROOKINGS Disc. PAPERS 37 (1996).
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the martyr complex among Bosnian Serbs."l' Thus, the policy of con-
ditional aid became de facto a policy of constructive engagement.
But it soon became clear that the policy of constructive engagement
was depriving the Yugoslav Tribunal of one of its few means of exert-
ing pressure on recalcitrant authorities and that, with the indicted war-
lords still in control of Republika Srpska, the financial assistance was
being diverted from its intended beneficiaries. Consequently, out of a
total of $3.1 billion pledged for Bosnian reconstruction in 1997, only
15% was earmarked to the Republika Srpska,112 while the other 85%
went to the Croat-Muslim Federation to reward it for its compliance
with the Dayton Accords and its cooperation with the Yugoslav
Tribunal. 113
By the 1.998 summit in Brussels, however, international aid donors
were expressing confidence in the "new climate" in Bosnia. Under its
new Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, the Republika Srpska agreed to
let the ICTY Prosecutor open an office in Banja Luka, and convinced
two Bosnian Serb indictees (Milan Simic and Miroslav Tadic) to turn
themselves in to the Tribunal.' 14 With these events as a backdrop, the
donor nations pledged an additional $1.25 billion in reconstruction aid
for Bosnia and, noting with satisfaction the "efforts at reconciliation
by the new republika Srpska," they decided that the new aid package
would be "more balanced than in the past."'1 5
The mechanism of financial inducement achieved its largest mea-
sure of success with respect to Croatia. Croatia allowed the ICTY
Prosecutor to open an office in Zagreb in November 1994, but failed
to execute the arrest warrants issued by the Tribunal. In the face of
threats by the United States to veto substantial International Mone-
tary Fund ("IMF") and World Bank loans to Croatia, in April 1997
Croatia surrendered indicted Bosnian Croat war criminal Zlatko
Aleksovsk, who had commanded the notorious Kaonik detention fa-
cility, to the Tribunal." 16 That same month indicted Croatian General
Tihofil Blaskic voluntarily surrendered to the Tribunal through the
mediation of the Croatian government.
When it was disclosed that ten indicted Bosnian Croats had been
given refuge in Croatia, the United States moved to block another
111. See id.
112. See Barbier, supra note 106.
113. See Third Annual Report, supra note 77, at para. 167.
114. See Misha Savic, Two Serbs Suspected of War Crimes Surrender Voluntarily to Tribunal,
SAN DIEGO U. TRM., Feb. 15, 1998, at A24.
115. Barbier, supra note 106.
116. See ICTY Press Release, Accused Aleksovski Turned Over to the Tribunal, U.N. Doc.
CC/PIO/185-E (1997).
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crucial IMF loan to Croatia. Immediately thereafter, on October 6,
1997, Dario Kordic and nine other indicted Bosnian Croats "volunta-
rily" surrendered to the Tribunal under pressure from Zagreb.
Kordic, the Vice-President of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-
Bosna, is the highest ranking indicted Croat war criminal.'1 7 The de-
velopment took the Croat public by surprise as only two weeks earlier
the Croatian Prime Minister, Zlatko Matesa, set a defiant tone on the
subject of the extradition of war crime suspects: "We will not trade
with our people or extradite them in order to get loans."118 Kordic
explained his surrender as a patriotic act on behalf of the Croatian
state which has been "subject[ed] to tremendous unjust pressure from
the international community."" 9 The day that Kordic was surren-
dered, the IMF approved the loan to Croatia. 20 In August 1999, a
thirteenth indicted Croat war criminal (Vinko Martinovic) was trans-
ferred from Croatia to the Tribunal.' 21 Thus, Croatia's cooperation,
induced by the conditionality of financial assistance, resulted in the
surrender of half of the indicted war criminals in custody at The
Hague.
Positive economic incentives have been used in the past to induce
parties to make peace, as for example, in the mideast. The ICTY pre-
cedent suggests that the same type of approach can be used to success-
fully coax parties into cooperating with the ICC. The advocates of this
approach, however, will always be at odds with those who favor con-
structive engagement as a means for reforming a society in the after-
math of conflict marked by atrocities.
D. The Offer of Rewards
Another type of positive financial inducement is the offering of re-
wards for assistance in the arrest of indicted war criminals.
As with assassination, international law prohibits putting a price on
an enemy's head.122 But that does not mean that States cannot offer a
117. See Chris Hedges, 10 Bosnian Croats Surrender to War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
7, 1997, at A3; Louis-Marie Tattevin, Ten Bosnian Croat War Crimes Suspects Surrender to UN,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library International News
File.
118. Premier Rejects Linking Aid and Cooperation with War Crimes Tribunal, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, newsfile.
119. Hedges, supra note 117, at A3.
120. Id.
121. See ICTY Press Release, Vinko Martinovic ("Stela") Surrendered to ICTY By the Repub-
lic of Croatia, U.N. Doc. CC/P.I.S./427-e (1999).
122. See Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on
Biological and Chemical Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization, 20
MICH. J. INT'L L. 477, 496 n.94 (1999) [hereinafter Scharf, Clear and Present Danger].
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reward for information or assistance leading to the arrest and convic-
tion of indicted war criminals. On June 24, 1999, the United States
announced that it was offering a reward of $5 million for such infor-
mation and assistance related to indicted Yugoslav war criminals.123
The U.S. rewards program was established by the 1984 Act to Com-
bat International Terrorism, Public Law 98-533. Under the program,
in addition to the reward money, the recipients and their immediate
family members may be relocated to the United States, or elsewhere,
and are assured of complete confidentiality. 124 To date, more than $6
million has been paid out for help in twenty terrorism cases.125 In
October 1998, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation expanding the re-
wards program to cover war crimes, as well as terrorism.126 Whereas
the terrorism rewards program is operated out of the office of Diplo-
matic Security, the war crimes rewards will be coordinated by Robert
Gelbard's office, which is in charge of carrying out the Dayton
Accords. 127
Thousands of flyers and posters, advertising the U.S. War Crimes
Rewards program, have been distributed throughout Europe and the
former Yugoslavia.1 28 The immediate effect of this program is likely
to be the identification of indicted Yugoslav war criminals in Euro-
pean countries where many have taken refuge under assumed identi-
ties. It may also serve to further isolate Serb warlords in Republika
Srpska, who will quickly lose trust in colleagues who could be plan-
123. See Peter Almond, US Puts $5m Price on the Head of War Criminal Milosevic, EVENING
STANDARD (LONDON), June 25, 1999, at 2.
124. See U.S. Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Counter-Terrorism Re-
wards Program <http://www.heroes.net/pub/heroes/content2.html>.
125. See Almond, supra note 123, at 2.
126. See U.S. Will Offer Bounties for Bosnian War Crimes Suspects, 15 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.
RVrR. 39 (1999).
127. See id.
128. The text of these flyers reads as follows:
Since 1991, thousands of residents of the former Yugoslavia have been raped, mur-
dered, tortured or imprisoned. The victims of these crimes against humanity deserve
justice. Many of these crimes are serious violations of international humanitarian law,
and many of the people who committed them are subjects of criminal indictments by
the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. To
bring to justice those who have been indicted for these crimes, the United States Gov-
ernment is offering a reward for information.
Individuals who furnish information leading to the arrest or conviction in any coun-
try, of a war criminal indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal, may be eligible
for a reward of up to $5 million, and protection of their identities. A reward may also
be paid for information leading to the transfer to, or conviction by, the International
Criminal Tribunal of an indicted war criminal.
Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Department of State, Crimes Against Humanity
<http://www.heroes.net/warcrimes/torture.html>.
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ning to turn them in for millions in reward money. With respect to
Slobodan Milosevic, who became the first head of state with his pic-
ture on a "wanted poster," it will constitute a strong symbolic gesture,
fueling the popular effort to replace the Serb leader. The ICC could
similarly benefit from the institution of a rewards program. The
amount required for reward offers is a relatively small price compared
to the costs of running the ICC, which are discussed above.
V. ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE THROUGH
USE OF FORCE
Despite the creation of the ICTY and the Western countries' re-
peated promises to support the Tribunal's mandate, NATO failed to
use force to implement international criminal justice-by appre-
hending indicted war criminals in its area of operations in Bosnia. To
justify its inaction, the NATO commanders claimed that NATO's
mandate in Bosnia did not permit use of force in aid of international
criminal justice except under extremely limited circumstances (i.e.,
when indicted war criminals are "encountered in the course of its du-
ties and if the tactical situation permits"). 129 As a result, until July
1997, NATO forces declined to apprehend a single war criminal,
prompting the ICTY's chief Prosecutor at the time, Louise Arbour, to
complain to the press: "I think it's scandalous that those who have the
responsibility for his arrest continue to fail to fulfill that obliga-
tion. '1 30 Later, NATO forces were used to apprehend a handful of
low and mid-level indictees, while indicted Bosnian Serb leaders
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, and Serb President Slobodan
Milosevic, were given de facto impunity. This experience indicates
both the great potential and immense difficulty posed by the use of
military force as a tool for enforcing international criminal justice.
A. The Obligation to Arrest War Criminals
On December 20, 1995, a 60,000-personnel NATO Implementation
Force known as IFOR (which a year later was transformed into the
30,000 strong NATO Stabilization Force known as SFOR) was
deployed in Bosnia.131 One of the great mysteries surrounding the
Bosnia peace settlement is whether IFOR's failure to arrest war
129. See Press Briefing by National Security Adviser Berger on Bosnia, U.S. NEWSWIRE, July
10, 1997 [hereinafter Berger Press Briefing].
130. Lee Hockstader, The Rumor Heard Round the World, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1997, at
A14.
131. See Peace Agreements Bring a 'Long-Delayed Birth of Hope': Multinational Force Set Up
in Bosnia to Replace UNPROFOR, 33 U.N. CHRON. 25, 26 (1996).
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criminals was a product of the way its mandate was drafted in the
Dayton Accords and related Security Council Resolution or the way
its mandate was implemented by reluctant NATO commanders.
IFOR's mandate and mission were set forth in Security Council
Resolution 1031, adopted on December 13, 1995, which authorizes
"IFOR" to "take such actions as required, including the use of neces-
sary force, to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agree-
ment."1 32 Article X of Annex 1-A provides inter alia that the parties
undertake to "cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementa-
tion of this peace settlement" such as those which are authorized by
the Security Council "including the International Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia." 133 Read together, these provisions give IFOR the
authority to use force to ensure compliance with the Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal's arrest orders.
To the extent there was any ambiguity in this regard, it was elimi-
nated by the statements made by the representatives of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France in the Security Council at the
time Resolution 1031 was adopted. Thus, in her explanation of vote,
Ambassador Albright of the United States remarked:
Let me emphasize that Annex 1-A of the Dayton Agreement ob-
ligates the parties to cooperate fully with the International Tribunal.
The North Atlantic Council can now underscore this obligation by
explicitly authorizing IFOR to transfer indicted persons it comes
across to the Tribunal and to detain such persons for that
purpose. ' 34
Echoing this position, the U.K. representative stated:
Should it be decided that, in the execution of its assigned tasks,
the Implementation Force should detain and transfer to the appro-
priate authorities any persons indicted by the Tribunal who come
into contact with it in Bosnia, then the authority to do so is provided
by the draft resolution before us, read together with the provisions
of the Peace Agreement.135
France, too, affirmed that paragraph 5 "recognizes the role that IFOR
may play to ensure proper cooperation" with the Tribunal. 136 The
other members of the Security Council did not make any specific
statements concerning the role of IFOR in the arrest of suspects, but
132. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 3607th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3607 (1995).
133. Dayton Peace Accords, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/50/810-S/1995/1021 (1995).
134. S.C. Res. 1031, at 20.
135. Id. at 18.
136. Id. at 21.
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Russia warned that it "will consistently defend the need to avoid un-
justified use of force in the course of the operation."' 37
There are several limitations inherent in IFOR's mission statement
as set forth above. First, IFOR was provided the "authority" but not
the "duty" to arrest indicted persons. Had the Council wished to ex-
plicitly give IFOR this responsibility, it could have used the phrase
"calls upon" rather than "authorizes." Second, in accordance with the
United States and British interpretive statements, this authority was
limited to indicted war criminals that IFOR "comes across" or "comes
into contact with"-giving ammunition to those who would argue that
it would be inappropriate for IFOR to actively seek out such persons
for arrest. Finally, Article XII of Annex 1-A provides that "the IFOR
Commander is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation
of this agreement on the military aspects of the peace settlement
... 138 Therefore, it is within the IFOR Commander's complete dis-
cretion to determine whether or not action to arrest an indicted war
criminal is warranted in the particular circumstances of a case.
The day the Dayton Accords were signed by the Parties in Paris, the
President and the Prosecutor of the Yugoslavia Tribunal issued a joint
statement. The statement underscored "the authority of IFOR to
arrest indicted war criminals" and concluded that "this Agreement
promises that those who have committed crimes which threaten inter-
national peace and security - genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes - will be brought to justice."'' 39 But this optimistic public
assessment of the role of IFOR in apprehending indicted war
criminals was not shared behind the scenes by many of the Tribunal's
top officials. Grant Niemann, the Tribunal's Senior Trial Attorney,
bluntly told the author of this Article that "The Dayton Agreement
doesn't seriously attempt to address the arrest and detention issue.
Anyone who says otherwise is deluded or lying."140
In his recently published memoir, Richard Holbrooke, the U.S.
Chief Negotiator at Dayton, describes the story behind the crafting of
IFOR's limited mandate with respect to arresting indicted war
criminals. Holbrooke maintains that he argued that the Dayton Ac-
cords explicitly give the NATO force responsibility to arrest war
criminals but the Pentagon, supported by National Security Adviser
137. Id. at 25.
138. Dayton Peace Accords, supra note 133.
139. ICTY Press Release, Joint Statement By the President and the Prosecutor, U.N. Doc. CC/
PIO/027-E (1995).
140. Interview with Grant Neimann, Senior Trial Attorney in the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Office
of the Prosecutor, The Hague, Netherlands (Aug. 11, 1998).
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Tony Lake and Secretary of Defense William Perry, opposed ex-
panding IFOR's mandate beyond disengaging the warring parties and
force protection.' 41 Military commanders were anxious to avoid a re-
peat of the disaster in Somalia, where eighteen American troops were
ambushed and slaughtered while trying to apprehend the warlord Mo-
hammed Farrah Aidid. Holbrooke recounts that "as a result of the
scars left over from the Mogadishu affair in Somalia, the [military]
would not accept the assignment of search and capture of war
criminals unless they had a force structure two or three or five times
larger than the 60,000" envisioned in the Dayton Accords. 142 A week
before the Dayton negotiations, a compromise was reached in which
the Pentagon agreed to accept "the authority" to make arrests "but
not the obligation. ' 143 In his memoir, Holbrooke laments, "had I
known then how reluctant IFOR would be to use its 'authority,' I
would have fought harder for a stronger mission statement. '144
Richard Holbrooke claims that he told President Clinton on the eve
of Dayton: "If we are going to create a real peace rather than an un-
easy cease-fire... Karadzic and Mladic will have to be captured. This
is not simply a question of justice but also of peace. If they are not
captured, no peace agreement we create in Dayton can ultimately suc-
ceed.' 45 According to Holbrooke, President Clinton concurred, say-
ing "[i]t is best to remove both men."' 46 But the President never gave
the military a direct instruction to that effect, and as this Article goes
to press six years after Dayton, the NATO forces have still taken no
action to bring Karadzic and Mladic into custody.147
Thus, Holbrooke publicly blamed the Pentagon and the President,
but others believe the failure to give NATO the responsibility of ar-
resting war criminals may actually have been a quid pro quo counte-
nanced by Holbrooke and the other Dayton negotiators in return for
Slobodan Milosevic's support of the Dayton Accords.1 48 Graham
Blewitt, the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Deputy Prosecutor confided that
the Office of the Prosecutor has had continuing concerns about
whether there were any side deals. According to Blewitt: "To this day
141. See HOLBROOKE, supra note 76, at 216-18.
142. Louis Freedberg, Talking Your Way Out of Hell: When Richard Holbrooke Sat Down at
an Ohio Table to Pound Out a Pea, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library News File (quoting Richard Holbrooke).
143. HOLBROOKE, supra note 76, at 222.
144. Id. at 223.
145. Id. at 226, 315.
146. Id. at 315.
147. See id. at 316.
148. See Forsythe, International Criminal Courts, supra note 28, at 11.
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we don't know whether there were any. Maybe one day we will find
out. But that is one of the concerns, that people were made promises
that even if they signed and agreed to certain things that they
wouldn't be held accountable."'' 49
At a minimum, Holbrooke had to have recognized that the Penta-
gon's insistence on a limited role for IFOR made his job, as negotiator
easier. On the eve of the Dayton talks, the Prosecutor of the Yugosla-
via Tribunal, Richard Goldstone, pressed the United States to beef up
the provisions on arrests of war criminals.150 Holbrooke reportedly
responded that he would not make the war crimes issue a "show stop-
per" to the larger peace settlement. 151
As noted above, under the Dayton Accords, the person responsible
for determining whether action by IFOR to arrest indicted war
criminals is warranted was IFOR Commander Admiral Leighton
Smith. Smith literally interpreted away IFOR's limited mandate to
arrest war criminals. Upon assuming his command in January 1996,
Admiral Smith told the press: "One of the questions I was asked was,
'Admiral, is it true that IFOR is going to arrest Serbs in the Serb sub-
urbs of Sarajevo?' I said, 'Absolutely not, I don't have the authority to
arrest anybody.""' 5 2 He explained: "It would help a lot of people's
tasks if [indicted Bosnian Serb war criminals Radovan Karadzic and
Ratko Mladic] were gone, but I'm not authorized to do that. Hold
those who signed Dayton responsible and get off IFOR's back."' 53
In February 1996, the Washington Post ran a story alleging that
Karadzic had driven unchallenged through four NATO checkpoints-
two of them manned by Americans-on a trip between the Bosnian
towns of Pale and Banja Luka. When confronted with the story, Ad-
miral Smith reaffirmed that it was not the mission of his forces to go
after indicted war criminals.154 Since Article XII in Annex 1-A of the
Dayton Accords provides that "the IFOR Commander is the final au-
thority in theater regarding interpretation of this agreement," Smith's
position was technically unassailable. This led the Tribunal's Prosecu-
tor to declare in disgust: "There is no moral, legal or political justifica-
tion for a military authority to grant effective immunity to persons
149. Blewitt Interview, supra note 85.
150. See Stephen Engelberg, Panel Seeks U.S. Pledge on Bosnia War Criminals, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1995, at Al.
151. See id.
152. HOLBROOKE, supra note 76, at 328.
153. Tracy Wilkinson, Bosnian Serb Leaders Seen as Barrier to Peace, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29,
1996, at Al.
154. See HOLBROOKE, supra note 76, at 339.
20001
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
whom the prosecutor, on behalf of the Security Council, has deter-
mined should be brought to trial. ' 155
The Dayton Accords and Resolution 1031 are not the only source
of international law binding on the NATO force in Bosnia. In addi-
tion to being an enforcement measure of the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Tribunal is also considered a
subsidiary organ of the Security Council with delegated enforcement
powers within the terms of Article 29 of the U.N. Charter. 156 The
Tribunal's Statute, approved by Security Council Resolution 827,
grants the Tribunal the authority to issue international arrest warrants,
which must be complied with "without undue delay." 157 Article 48(2)
of the U.N. Charter requires Member States to carry out the decisions
of the Security Council (and its subsidiary bodies) under Chapter VII
of the Charter "directly or through their action in the appropriate in-
ternational agencies of which they are members"I 58-which would in-
clude NATO.
Colonel John Burton, the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff ("JCS"), explained the legal obligation that flows
from such international arrest warrants in the following terms:
The Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal has issued these orders.
Now, orders can be issued to ... all the Member States who are
going to play a part of this NATO force. And if those orders say not
only in your territory, but in any jurisdiction under your control,
would they apply in Bosnia? In other words, if the United States
had such an order, that in Bosnia that the United States is charged
to arrest and detain these people and turn them over, would we be
bound? As far as a state obligation goes, I think that the answer is,
"Yes." We view these orders, and literally the Statute of the Tribu-
nal itself, as well as the United Nations Resolution under Chapter
VII that set it up, as binding. 159
Thus, according to the JCS Legal Counsel, IFOR would have to im-
plement the Tribunal's arrest warrants, provided two criteria were
met: (1) the orders were issued to the NATO States; and (2) the or-
ders referred to making arrests in Bosnia.
On July 11, 1996, a Trial Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal issued
an "International Arrest Warrant and Order for Surrender," in the
cases of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic which met these two
155. Jon Swain, Serb War Criminals Flaunt Their Freedom, SUNDAY TIMES, June 23, 1996, § 1,
at 18.
156. See S.C. Res. 808, supra note 9, at para. 28.
157. ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 29.
158. U.N. CHARTER art. 48, para. 2.
159. Colonel John T. Burton, "War Crimes" During Operations Other Than War: Military
Doctrine and Law 50 Years after Nuremberg and Beyond, 149 MIL. L. REV. 199, 203-04 (1995).
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criteria. 60 By virtue of Security Council Resolution 1088 (1996),
which establishes SFOR as the legal successor to IFOR, this directive
applies with continuing effect to SFOR. Yet, instead of arresting
Karadzic and Mladic pursuant to this international legal obligation,
IFOR instituted a controversial policy of "monitor, don't touch."
B. NATO Policy on Arresting Yugoslav War Criminals
1. Phase I: Monitor, Don't Touch
When IFOR initially deployed in Bosnia "there was a perception
that priority should be military disengagement," and that "the tenuous
stability which had been created could be undermined if NATO be-
came entangled in arresting indicted war criminals." 161 According to
Richard Holbrooke, "the military viewed the Serbs as a potent mili-
tary force that would threaten IFOR as it had the U.N. ' 162 These
fears were fanned by the incendiary statements emanating from the
indicted Bosnian Serb leaders. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic
warned that Bosnia "could blow up" if IFOR attempted to arrest the
Bosnian Serb leaders who had been indicted by the Tribunal. 1 63 And
General Mladic promised that the IFOR forces would pay heavily if
they tried to arrest him. "They have to understand one thing, that I
am very expensive and that my people support me," Mladic told an
interviewer.1 64
But, according to Major General William Nash, the commander of
IFOR's Task Force Eagle, "We overestimated the difficult task that
we had in front of us."'1 65 The reality of the situation was that "the
Bosnian Serbs were a spent force" and that Mladic and especially
Karadzic were vulnerable targets. 166 According to a Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal official, in the months following Dayton, "it would have been pos-
sible to arrest Karadzic and Mladic with little consequences because
the Bosnian Serbs were so demoralized. The failure to arrest them
160. See International Arrest Warrant and Order for Surrender, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-
95-18-R61 (July 11, 1996) (reproduced in Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., International Obligations to
Search for and Arrest War Criminals: Government Failure in the Former Yugoslavia, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 411, 448-49 (1997)).
161. Interview with Payan Akhavan, Legal Adviser, Office of the Prosecutor, International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Netherlands, The Hague (Aug. 11, 1998).
162. HOLBROOKE, supra note 76, at 218.
163. See Jane Perlez, War Crimes Prosecutor Vents Frustrations, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at
A8.
164. Shrugging Off Indictment, Bosnian Serb General Skis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at A3.
165. Interview with General William Nash, Cambridge, Massachusetts (Sept. 29, 1998).
166. HOLBROOKE, supra note 76, at 218.
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allowed them to once again consolidate their power and begin to
cause problems for the NATO forces. '167
Despite the menace posed by Karadzic and Mladic while they re-
mained at large, according to Major General Nash, the Rules of En-
gagement permitted apprehending indicted war criminals only "if the
risk was minimal and it would not result in a major fight."'1 68 In prac-
tice, "minimal risk" was interpreted as "zero risk. ' 169 Experts point to
this so-called "zero casualty doctrine" as a significant reason why
NATO failed to make any arrests in Bosnia for nineteen months fol-
lowing the deployment of IFOR. 170
A second reason for NATO's failure was the requirement that
IFOR act only when indicted war criminals are "encountered." In
February 1996, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns ex-
plained IFOR's narrow interpretation of the term: "In the interests of
freedom of movement in Bosnia, U.S. troops are not intercepting ci-
vilian cars at checkpoints. If our troops encounter [indicted war
criminals] walking around, though, they will be detained."'17 Thus
one IFOR commander confirmed that his troops "would arrest sus-
pects like Radovan Karadzic only if they literally stumble into an
IFOR checkpoint.' 72
In fact, the record suggests that IFOR would not even arrest in-
dicted suspects under these circumstances. In August 1997, when
IFOR inspectors learned that General Ratko Mladic happened to be
inside a bunker they had planned to inspect, they rescheduled their
visit rather than confront the indicted war criminal. Two days before
the September 1997 elections in Bosnia, the United States Com-
mander of IFOR, Admiral Joseph Lopez, met with Serb officials in
the headquarters of Radovan Karadzic, who was reportedly inside the
building at the time. "And in a virtuoso display of IFOR's talent for
not 'stumbling into' Mladic or Karadzic, none of the 53,000 I-FOR
troops deployed to provide security on election day in mid September
167. Akhavan Interview, supra note 161.
168. Nash Interview, supra note 165.
169. As the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Deputy Prosecutor, Graham Blewitt explained: "[i]f the
NATO forces think there is any risk of casualties then they won't move." Blewitt Interview,
supra note 85.
170. Akhavan Interview, supra note 161.
171. Barry Schweid, U.S. Warns War Crimes Suspects to Avoid Traveling in Bosnia, AP, Feb.
14, 1996, available at 1996 WL 4411795.
172. Diane F. Orentlicher, Swapping Amnesty for Peace and the Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Crimes, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 713, 716 (1997).
[Vol. 49:925
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
had an arrest-worthy encounter with these men, although both report-
edly turned out to vote. '173
IFOR officials concocted a litany of excuses for their policy of non-
action, including: (1) arresting war criminals would jeopardize the
fragile Bosnian peace; (2) arresting war criminals could damage
NATO's image of impartiality among Bosnia's factions and invite re-
taliation against NATO troops; (3) arresting war criminals would dis-
rupt municipal and federal elections in Bosnia; (4) arresting war
criminals is the responsibility of governments in the region, not inter-
national troops; (5) the NATO forces do not have reliable intelligence
information about the whereabouts of the war criminals; and (6)
NATO troops are not trained to arrest criminal suspects. 174
2. Phase II: Limited Case-by-Case Arrests
Consistent with IFOR's narrow interpretation of its mandate, in the
first months after their deployment, IFOR personnel were not pro-
vided a list of names, let alone pictures of the persons indicted by the
Yugoslavia Tribunal. 175 Responding to public criticism of NATO
troops for failing to apprehend Karadzic when he passed through
NATO checkpoints, in February 1996 a new set of instructions were
issued from NATO high command in Brussels.176 Pursuant to these
instructions, "Most Wanted" posters featuring photographs and de-
scriptions of the indicted war criminals were placed at IFOR check-
points, headquarters, and barracks. 177
While the dissemination of these posters might lead to more known
"encounters" at NATO checkpoints, the new policy did not mean that
IFOR troops would actively seek out the indicted war criminals for
arrest. John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in-
formed Congress that even if IFOR had orders to arrest the indicted
war criminals who are at large in Bosnia, the NATO force just does
not have enough intelligence information on their whereabouts. 178 To
the embarrassment of the Clinton Administration, Shalikashvili's as-
sertion was countered by a Washington-based group called the Coali-
tion for International Justice, which had been able to locate most of
the indicted war criminals from telephone directories and news re-
173. Id.
174. See Kenneth Roth, Why Justice Needs NATO, NATION, Sept. 22, 1997, at 21-22 (providing
detailed responses to each of these excuses for non-action).
175. Nash Interview, supra note 165.
176. See All Things Considered, N.P.R. Broadcast, Feb. 12, 1996.
177. See id.
178. See Colon Soloway & Stephen J. Hedges, How Not to Catch a War Criminal, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Dec. 9, 1996, at 63-64.
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ports. 179 A year later, military officials acknowledged that the claim
that they lacked intelligence information was largely false, and that
Western military officials have long known where virtually all of the
alleged criminals are located 80
With the election of Tony Blair as British Prime Minister, the
United Kingdom began to press NATO for a more forceful policy on
arresting indicted war criminals. Surprisingly, it was the United Na-
tions peacekeeping force in Croatia, and not the NATO force, which
made the first arrest. In June 1997, an agent of the Tribunal's Office
of the Prosecutor lured indicted war criminal Slavko Dokmanovic out
of Serbia and into Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), where he was appre-
hended by U.N. peacekeeping forces, and delivered to the Yugoslavia
Tribunal.' 8
Encouraged by the success of the U.N. operation, a month later, on
July 10, 1997, British IFOR troops arrested indicted war criminal Mi-
lan Kovacevic at his home in Republika Srpska and transferred him to
the Tribunal. 182 That same day, British forces shot and killed indicted
war criminal Simo Drjaca, the former police chief in Prijedor, when he
fired upon them as they sought his arrest.'183
Following Britain's lead, four months later, on December 18, 1997,
Dutch IFOR troops, using tear gas and stun grenades, raided the
homes and arrested Vlatko Kupreskic, and Anto Furundzija. 184 The
two had been indicted for raping and murdering civilians in the Lasva
Valley area of Bosnia in 1993.15
Then, on January 22, 1998, American soldiers swept into the small
town of Bijeljin and made their first arrest of an indicted war criminal
in Bosnia: Goran Jelisic, a Bosnian Serb who liked to refer to himself
as "the Serbian Adolf."' 18 6 Jelisic commanded the Luka camp during
May 1992, and is charged with systematically killing Muslims and com-
179. See Steven Lee Myers, Rights Group Says Bosnian Suspects Flaunt Freedom, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 1996, at All.
180. See Smith, supra note 97, at A32.
181. See Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic, Decision on the Motion for Release by the Ac-
cused Slavko Dokmanovic, No. IT-95-13a-PT, T., Ch. II, Oct. 22, 1997 [hereinafter Dokmanovic,
Decision on the Motion for Release]. Dokmanovic was Mayor of Vukovar, the capital of East-
ern Slavonia, and administrator of the Ovcara area at the time of the massacre. He was charged
with six counts of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs
of war, and crimes against humanity for his role in the massacre.
182. See Berger Press Briefing, supra note 129.
183. See id.
184. See Jonathan Steele, Dutch Size War Crimes Suspects, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 19,
1997, at 11.
185. See id.
186. Republika Srpska unmoved by arrest of Serb "Hitler," AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 23,
1998, available in LEXIS, newsfile.
[Vol. 49:925
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
mitting other atrocities there. United States SFOR forces undertook
a second snatch operation on September 27, 1998, resulting in the ap-
prehension of indicted war criminal Stevan Todorovic, formerly the
Serb chief of police in Bosanski Samac.187 They undertook a third
operation on December 2, 1998, resulting in the arrest of Radislav
Krstic, a Bosnian Serb general charged with directing the 1995 attack
on the "safe area" of Srebrenica, in which as many as 10,000 civilians
were killed. 188 The most recent arrest occurred on December 20,
1999, when U.S. IFOR forces in Banja Luka arrested retired Serb Ma-
jor General Stanislav Galic, who had commanded the Sarajevo
Romanija corps, which subjected the civilian inhabitants of Sarajevo
to continuous shelling and sniper fire from 1992-1995.189
While U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, asserted that
these arrests were "in keeping with the rules we have had all
along,"'190 none of the persons who were the subject of these NATO
actions were encountered in public at the time of their arrests. Thus,
NATO officials put a new gloss on the description of the NATO mis-
sion, saying "the policy is to apprehend suspects on a case-by-case ba-
sis or if NATO troops encounter them on patrols." Under its
modified mission statement, officials said NATO's strategy is to con-
centrate on "plucking low-hanging fruit" or capturing those war
criminals that have the least protection and the most predictable daily
routines."1 91
Payam Akhavan of the Office of the ICTY Prosecutor describes the
reason for the July 1997 change in the NATO policy on arresting war
criminals as follows:
As time went on, as the immediate objective of military disengage-
ment was achieved, it became clear that the NATO force was not
going to achieve stability if the Serb warlords continued to exercise
power.... While I'm not at liberty to disclose the details, I can say
that much of the determination to arrest these people ... came from
the soldiers on the ground and not from officials at NATO head-
quarters or distant capitals. There was a sense on the part of a lot of
the soldiers on the ground that people like Milan Kovacevic and
187. See Robert MacPherson, Bosnian Serb Snatched in NATO Operation, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Sept. 27, 1998, available in LEXIS.
188. See Statement by the Prosecutor Regarding the Detention of Radislav Krstic, ICTY Press
Release No. JL/PIU/368-E (Dec. 2,1998); Steven Erlanger, Bosnian Serb General Is Arrested By
Allied Force in Genocide Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al.
189. Bosnian Serb General Arrested on War Crimes Charges, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec.
20, 1999, available in LEXIS.
190. Jeffrey Fleishman, U.S. Forces Make First Bosnian War-Crimes Arrest, FRESNO BEE. Jan.
23, 1998, at A14.
191. Smith, supra note 97, at A32.
20001
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Simo Drljaca were one of the main destabilizing factors and they
had to be removed one way or another. The fact that there were
indictments on these two people became a very convenient pretext
to get rid of them. So, I'm not saying that the impulse was to sup-
port justice but rather that the existence of the tribunal was very
convenient. 192
The new NATO policy came under criticism by Carl Bildt, the
United Nations High Representative for Bosnia, who complained that
going after minor figures served as "giving advanced warning" to the
higher level indicted war criminals such as Karadzic and Mladic, and
risked destabilizing the fragile peace in Bosnia.193 But the arrests of
Kovacevic, Kupreskic, Furundzija, Jelisic, Todorovic, and Galic, and
the killing of Drjaca had the effect of inducing other indicted war
criminals to turn themselves in, lest they be brought in by the NATO
troops dead or alive. Thus, a dozen indicted war criminals surren-
dered to the Tribunal in the months after the first few British, Dutch,
and American snatch operations. 194
Not all of the segments of IFOR, however, adopted this more ag-
gressive case-by-case approach to arresting indicted war criminals.
The French, which command the NATO troops that patrol the Serb
stronghold of Pale (where Karadzic is believed to reside) have ex-
pressed no enthusiasm for capturing war criminals. An unnamed Se-
nior U.S. Official told the Washington Post that
France's inaction may be partly due to the trauma experienced by
the French military command in May 1995, when Serb forces cap-
tured dozens of French officers employed as observers by the
United Nations and chained them to bridges or radar sites that were
prospective NATO bombing targets. They want no repeat of this
and therefore no involvement with war criminals at all.195
France's reluctance was exemplified in March 1998, when a Serb
named Dragoljub Kunarac, indicted in June 1996 on charges of gang
rape, torture, and enslavement of Muslim women, first offered to sur-
render to French military forces in the town of Pilipovic in eastern
Bosnia.196 Nearly a week passed before the French concluded that
"they couldn't avoid taking his surrender," said one U.S. official, who
added that Washington has evidence that the French military com-
mand deferred to several senior officials in the Bosnian Serb govern-
192. Akhavan Interview, supra note 161.
193. See Batuk Gathani, Most Notorious War Criminals at Large, HINDU, July 15, 1997, at 10.
194. See Ewen Allison, News from the International War Crimes Tribunals, 5 HUM. RTS. BRIEF
3 (1998).
195. Smith, supra note 97, at A32.
196. See id.
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ment.197 Only after the Serbs gave their private approval did the
French take Kunarac into custody and transfer him to the Tribunal. 198
The French problem came to a head in April 1998, when The Wash-
ington Post reported that in the summer of 1997 the United States was
forced at the last minute to abort plans for the apprehension of
Radovan Karadzic when it was discovered that a senior French mili-
tary officer held secret meetings with Karadzic. 199 Afterwards, senior
Clinton Administration officials acknowledged that "they were quite
close to carrying it out, having determined how to arrange the capture
and which troops would be involved. °200 A senior official was quoted
as saying he found the episode "despicable and appalling" and that
"no trust" remains between the U.S. and French military forces in
Bosnia, a development that has led Washington to end virtually all
consultations with the French about the possible capture of indicted
war criminals.201
Subsequently, the United States announced that it did not intend to
renew the effort to apprehend Karadzic. 20 2 One can only guess
whether the announcement accurately reflected American policy, was
designed to keep Karadzic off-guard, or was merely an effort to de-
flate public expectations. While seizing Karadzic would have been a
public relations boon for the United States, by going public about the
aborted operation and blaming the French for its failure, the United
States succeeded in deflecting criticism of its anemic policy on arrest-
ing indicted war criminals. In the three years since the aborted opera-
tion to seize Karadzic, the United States has made no overt effort to
take the Bosnian Serb leader into custody. And despite indications
that IFOR had adopted a more robust policy with respect to arresting
lower level indicted war criminals (and reports that the United States
had established a specially trained unit for this purpose), there have
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See Smith, supra note 97, at A32. In response to intense international criticism about the
botched operation to apprehend Karadzic and the continuing failure of the French SFOR troops
to arrest other indicted war criminals in their area of operation in Bosnia, the French troops
conducted a daring predawn raid on April 3, 2000 in order to seize Karadzic's chief deputy,
Momcilo Krajisnik. Emboldened by his troops' successful arrest of Krajisnik, French Defense
Minister Alain Richard announced that "arresting Karadzic is now the French Army's prime
objective." Kevin Cullen, War Crimes Tribunal Wins New Esteem, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17,
2000, at Al, A14.
202. See AP, US Reportedly Ends Plan to Catch Bosnia War Criminals, BOSTON GLOBE, July
26, 1998, at A14.
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been only a few subsequent arrests of indictees by the NATO
forces. 203
If the ICC is to act in the aftermath of international or internal con-
flicts, it is likely that United Nations or coalition peacekeeping forces
will be deployed to areas where persons indicted by the ICC are lo-
cated. Where these troops are commissioned by the U.N. Security
Council or a specific peace agreement, they can be given the authority
to arrest such persons pursuant to the ICC's arrest warrants. The ex-
perience of the ICTY, however, suggests that the force commanders
will be reluctant to undertake this role. It is therefore important that
the Security Council Resolution or peace agreement specifically give
the troops the responsibility as well as the authority to make arrests-
the more explicit the mandate for arresting war criminals, the better.
C. Luring as a Means to Effectuate Arrests
1. Distinguishing Lawful Apprehension from Unlawful Abduction
With respect to the ICTY, the Dayton Peace Accords,20 4 Security
Council Resolution 1031,205 and the subsequent agreement of the Bos-
nian Government 20 6 make clear that NATO forces could lawfully ex-
ercise police powers (including arresting indicted war criminals) in
203. See Richard J. Newman, Hunting War Criminals, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 6,
1998, at 45-48.
204. The Dayton Accords, initialed in Dayton, Ohio in the United States on November 21,
1995, and signed on December 14, 1995, in Paris, consist of a General Framework Agreement, 11
annexes, and various related documents. The parties to the General Framework Agreement
include the three states which were parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia,
Croatia, and the FRY), and the two entities of the state of Bosnia (the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska). The FRY signed the General Framework Agreement
on behalf of the Republika Srpska by virtue of an agreement between them on August 29, 1995;
the Republika Srpska signed the annexes on its own behalf. In addition, the General Framework
Agreement was initialled and later signed by the European Union and the Contact Group coun-
tries (France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
205. The resolution recognizes that the parties to the Dayton Accords are required to cooper-
ate fully with the ICTY and have authorized IFOR "to take such actions as required, including
the use of necessary force," to implement the Tribunal's orders. U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th
mtg. at para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/103t (1995). See Statements of the United Kingdom and the
United States, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3607 (1996) (statements of
the United Kingdom at 8-9, and the United States at 19-21).
206. By letter dated December 21. 1995, the Bosnian Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed as
follows:
With regard to the arrest warrant of the International war crimes Tribunal in the Hague
concerning the citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina we agree that these
tasks be performed, along with our police force, also by members of the IFOR. We
also agree that those persons arrested in connection with the warrants of the tribunal
be handed over by the IFOR to the International Tribunal for war crimes.
Diane F. Orentlicher, Responsibility of States Participating in Multilateral Operations with Re-
spect to Persons Indicted for War Crimes, paper presented at the International Conference on
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Bosnia. Further, Security Council Resolution 1037, which with the
consent of Croatia and the FRY temporarily placed the administration
of Eastern Slavonia under United Nations Transitional Administra-
tion for Eastern Salvonia ("UNTAES") gave the United Nations
peacekeeping force the right to exercise police powers in that region
of Croatia. 20 7 Security Council Resolution 1244, which implemented
the Kosovo agreement in June 1999, similarly gave the KFOR forces
the authority to make arrests in Kosovo. 20 8 Consequently, there is no
violation of territorial integrity where coalition or United Nations per-
sonnel apprehend indicted war criminals in Bosnia, the Eastern Slavo-
nia region of Croatia, or the Kosovo region of Serbia. Apprehensions
conducted in other parts of the FRY or Croatia, however, are another
matter.
Even without the consent of the FRY or Croatia, the principle of
territorial integrity is not an absolute bar to apprehensions in their
territory. International law permits a state, for instance, to enter an-
other's territory in self-defense. 20 9 Thus, a state's authorities may jus-
tifiably engage in an unconsented apprehension in another state
against terrorists which pose a continuing threat and which are being
given sanctuary in the latter state.210 To the extent indicted war
criminals located in the FRY or Croatia constitute a threat to the
NATO or United Nations troops lawfully stationed in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia, this could provide justification for abducting
individuals from the FRY or Croatia for purposes of arrest.
Moreover, under the U.N. Charter, a state may enter another's ter-
ritory when specifically authorized by the Security Council pursuant
to its Chapter VII powers. Thus, the coalition forces that invaded Iraq
during the Gulf War were acting in accordance with international
law.21 1 Several Security Council Resolutions may be read together as
giving the NATO force the authority to enter the FRY to apprehend
Reigning in Impunity for International Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human
Rights, Siracusa, Italy, Sept. 16-20, 1997, at 5.
207. See U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3619th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1037 (1996); Basic Agreement
on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, signed on 12 November 1995.
U.N. Doc. A/50/757 (1995); U.N. Doc. S/1995/951 (1995).
208. See U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
209. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
210. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1979] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 93-94; Richard
B. Lillich & John M. Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist
Activities, 26 AM. U. L. REv. 217, 307-13 (1977).
211. See U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg. at para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990); U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3414th mtg. at para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994) (authorizing the invasion
of Haiti to restore the Aristide government).
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persons wanted by the ICTY. 212 According to the ICTY Appeals
Chamber in Blaskic, where the ICTY has made a judicial finding that
a state has breached its obligation to arrest persons indicted by the
ICTY under Article 29 of the ICTY Statute, and where "the Security
Council [has] not decided that it enjoyed exclusive powers on the mat-
ter," states are permitted to take unilateral or collective enforcement
actions. 213
The FRY has "not executed a single arrest warrant issued to it,"214
including arrest warrants against three persons publicly charged along
with Dokmanovic with complicity in the murder of 260 civilians and
unarmed men following the fall of the city of Vukovar. The then Pres-
ident of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, brought this non-compliance to
the attention of the Security Council so that it could "decide upon the
appropriate response. '215 On May 8, 1996, the Security Council is-
sued a statement declaring that it "deplores the failure to date of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to execute the arrest warrants issued
by the Tribunal against [these] individuals," but it has not yet taken
further action against the FRY.216 Under these circumstances, the
NATO or United Nations forces may be justified in conducting law
enforcement activities in the territory of the FRY notwithstanding the
general prohibition against such conduct under international law.
Consistent with this authority, NATO troops reportedly secretly en-
tered the FRY in April 2000 and snatched former Bosnian Serb prison
camp commander Dragan Nikolic from his home in the town of
Smederevo, located in Serbia just outside of Belgrade.
National, coalition, or U.N. forces may be justified under analogous
situations in apprehending persons indicted by a permanent interna-
tional criminal court even without the consent of the state in whose
territory the arrest occurs. But without the authorization of the Se-
212. See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at para. 4, U.N. Doe. S/RES/827 (1993) (requir-
ing states to comply with arrest orders pursuant to Article 29 of the ICTY Statute); S.C. Res.
1031 (1995) (establishing IFOR); U.N. SCOR, 51th Sess., 3723th mtg. at para. 18, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1088 (1996) (establishing SFOR as the successor to IFOR); ICTY's Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Rule 59 bis (A) IT/32/R5V.1 (1999) (authorizing the transmission of arrest warrants to
an appropriate authority or international body); see also Burton, supra note 159, at 203-04 (ex-
pressing the opinion that ICTY has the authority to issue orders that are binding on Member
States, including those participating in the NATO operation in Bosnia).
213. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of
the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 18 July 1997, at para. 36, No. IT-95-AR108 bis, Appeals
Chamber, Oct. 29, 1997.
214. Letter dated April 24, 1996, from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia to the President of the ICTY, U.N. Doc. S/1996/319 (1996).
215. Id.
216. Statement of the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1996/23 (1996).
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curity Council, the consent of the territorial state in a peace agree-
ment, or a situation that qualifies as self-defense, an apprehension of
an indicted war criminal may constitute an "unlawful abduction" in
violation of international law. Under international law, states and in-
ternational organizations may exercise police powers inside the terri-
tory of another state only with the consent of the host state.217 The
unconsented exercise of such powers constitutes an infringement of
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the host state in violation of
the U.N. Charter 218 and customary international law.
This principle finds support in several decisions of the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ"), and its predecessor the Permanent Court of
International Justice ("PCIJ"). In the 1927 S.S. Lotus case, for exam-
ple, the PCIJ held that jurisdiction cannot be exercised by a state
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from
international custom or convention.219 In the 1929 Corfu Channel
case, the ICJ recognized that "between independent States, respect
for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation" of international
law.220 And in the 1986 Military and Paramilitary Activities case, the
ICJ ruled that "the principle of non-intervention involves the right of
every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interfer-
ence; though examples of trespass against this principle are not infre-
quent, the Court considers its part and parcel of customary
international Law." 221
While none of these cases dealt specifically with the conduct of for-
eign police or investigators in a state without its permission, the prece-
dent is widely seen as prohibiting such action. Thus, the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides that "a state's law enforce-
ment officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another
state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized
officials of that state. '222 This position was confirmed by the United
Nations Sixth (Legal) Committee, whose members reached consensus
that "international law prohibits a state from exercising its criminal
jurisdiction beyond its territory as contrary to the sovereign equality
and territorial integrity of states, unless the other state concerned has
217. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (4th ed. 1990).
218. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
219. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18.
220. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 35.
221. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106.
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432(2)
(1986).
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given its consent. '223 Similarly, the Working Group on Arbitrary De-
tention of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has taken the posi-
tion that a basic principle of international law and international
relations is the "respect for the territorial sovereignty of States. ' 224
Citing the decisions of the PCIJ and ICJ mentioned above, the Work-
ing Group concluded that this principle prohibits a state from engag-
ing in unconsented law enforcement activity in the territory of another
state.22
5
2. The Effect of an Unlawful Abduction on the Jurisdiction of an
International Criminal Court
While recognizing that international law prohibits unconsented ab-
ductions, the domestic courts of some countries employ the mala cap-
tus bene detentus principle, meaning a person improperly seized may
nevertheless properly be detained.226 International precedent for the
principle goes back to the abduction of Adolf Eichmann, the engineer
of Hitler's "Final Solution," from Argentina by Israeli agents. The
Security Council adopted a resolution recognizing that the abduction
violated international law and requiring Israel to make "appropriate
reparation" to Argentina. 227 The resolution, however, did not require
Eichmann's return, and Argentina settled for a simple apology given
the universally condemned nature of Eichmann's crimes.22 8 Eich-
mann was subsequently tried, convicted, and executed in Israel with-
out further objection by the international community. 229
The U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed application of the
mala captus bene detentus principle in the case of United States v. Al-
varez-Machain.230 There, a Mexican doctor was abducted from Mex-
ico by U.S. agents and prosecuted in the United States for the torture-
murder of a DEA agent. The Alvarez-Machain case, however, has
been met with widespread criticism throughout the international com-
223. Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Work of the Sixth Committee
at the Forty-Eighth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 343, 357-58 (1993).
224. Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
50th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at 139-40, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1994/27 (1993) [hereinafter Arbitrary
Detention].
225. See id. at 139.
226. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 190 (1987).
227. 1960 U.N.Y.B. 196, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
228. See Paul Mitchell, English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to Transnational Forcible
Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383, 422-23 (1996).
229. See id.
230. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992) (holding that United States
courts had jurisdiction to try an individual forcibly abducted from Mexico without its consent).
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munity.231 Less than a year after the Alvarez-Machain decision, the
United Kingdom's House of Lords emphatically rejected the mala
captus bene detentus rule as inconsistent with evolving standards of
human rights. 232 At about the same time, twenty-one co-sponsoring
states introduced a General Assembly resolution that would request
an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice "on the
question of the conformity with international law of certain acts in-
volving the extraterritorial exercise of coercive power of a State and
the subsequent exercise of criminal jurisdiction. ' 233 While the resolu-
tion seeking an advisory opinion has been repeatedly deferred, 234 the
U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that "[the]
detention of Humberto Alvarez-Machain is declared to be arbitrary,
being in contravention of ... Article 9 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights .... "235
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that everyone has the right to liberty and security of person,
that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention," and
that "no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law."'236
The Human Rights Committee, which was established to monitor the
implementation of the Covenant, has ruled on several occasions that
transborder abductions violate Article 9 of the Covenant.2 37 Inter-
preting a similar provision in the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights, 238 the European Court of Human Rights
has stated that where state authorities are involved in a luring, the
rights of the individual under the Convention are violated.239 These
231. See Mark S. Zaid, Military Might Versus Sovereign Right: The Kidnapping of Dr.
Humberto Alvarez-Machain and the Resulting Fallout, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 829, 853-55 (1997).
232. See Regina v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court (ex parte Bennett), [1994] 1 App. Cas.
42 (Eng. H.L. 1993) (holding that a New Zealand citizen, forcibly returned to England from
South Africa, could obtain a stay of the criminal proceedings against him in England).
233. Morris & Bourloyannis-Vrailas, supra note 223, at 620 n.84.
234. Id. at 620.
235. Arbitrary Detention, supra note 224, at 139-40.
236. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, at
art. 9(1).
237. See Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 36th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 176, 185, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981).
238. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, at art. 5.
239. See Stocke v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A.) at 839 (1991) (Annex, Opinion of the
Commission, at para. 167). The Trial Chamber in the Dokmanovic case distinguished Stocke v.
Germany on the ground that "there was an extradition treaty between France and Germany, the
procedures of which were clearly not followed." See Dokmanovic, Decision on the Motion for
Release, supra note 181, at n.86.
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precedents would suggest that an international criminal tribunal
would have to dismiss a case where the defendant has been abducted
in violation of international law.
3. Luring as an Alternative to Unlawful Abduction
As an extraterritorial law enforcement practice, luring is much
more common, and less objectionable, than abductions. Unlike ab-
duction by force, weapons are not used to get the suspect to the loca-
tion where the arrest will occur. A luring can be accomplished
telephonically, by fax, or by e-mail. In this way, physical presence of
law enforcement authorities in the territory of the host state can be
avoided. Therefore, the risk of injury, damage, or incident in the host
state is minimized.
The ICTY had occasion to rule on the legality of luring in the case
of Slavko Dokmanovic, a Croatian Serb who was indicted in 1996 for
his complicity in the greatest single massacre of the 1991 war in Croa-
tia-the execution of 260 people forcibly taken out of a hospital in
Vukovar, eastern Croatia.240 The same day the indictment was issued,
an order for Dokmanovic's arrest was secretly transmitted to the UN-
TAES, 24 1 directing the U.N. forces to search for, arrest, and surrender
Dokmanovic to the ICTY.
Unfortunately, by the time UNTAES received the order for
Dokmanovic's arrest, he had moved from the Eastern Slavonia region
of Croatia to the FRY, 242 which had failed to execute the warrants
that remain outstanding for the arrest of the three co-accused in the
indictment against Dokmanovic.243 The ICTY's Office of the Prose-
cutor (OTP) thus turned to "plan B"-in June 1997, Kevin Curtis, an
OTP investigator, met with Dokmanovic at his home in the FRY in an
effort to lure Dokmanovic into Eastern Slavonia for arrest by UN-
TAES. Curtis purported to set up a meeting between Dokmanovic
and General Jacques Klein, the Transitional Administrator of Eastern
Slavonia, for the stated purpose of arranging for possible compensa-
tion for Dokmanovic's property in Eastern Slavonia, which he had
been forced to abandon. 244 In accordance with this arrangement, on
the afternoon of June 27, 1997, Dokmanovic crossed the border into
Eastern Slavonia under what he believed was a promise of safe con-
240. See supra note 181.
241. UNTAES was established to administer the region of Eastern Slavonia pending its return
to Croatian control. See S.C. Res. 1037.
242. See Dokmanovic, Decision on the Motion for Release, supra note 181, at para. 7.
243. The addition of Dokmanovic to the indictment was not disclosed to the FRY.
244. See id. at paras. 8-10.
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duct, and voluntarily entered an UNTAES vehicle which was to take
him to meet General Klein at the UNTAES base in the town of Erdut.
Upon arriving at Erdut, UNTAES soldiers removed Dokmanovic
from the vehicle at gunpoint and handcuffed him, while a member of
the OTP advised him of his rights and the charges against him.245
Dokmanovic was then flown on board an UNTAES airplane to The
Hague and handed over to the ICTY for trial.
In a pretrial motion, counsel for Dokmanovic argued that the man-
ner of Dokmanovic's arrest was illegal, violating the Statute and Rules
of the ICTY, the sovereignty of the FRY, and international law. In
particular, the defense argued that "Dokmanovic was arrested in a
'tricky way,' which can only be interpreted as a 'kidnapping,"' and
that "Dokmanovic's arrest violated the sovereignty of the FRY and
international law because he was arrested in the territory of the FRY
without the knowledge or approval of the competent State
authorities.'"246
The ICTY ruled that Dokmanovic had standing to raise these is-
sues.247 However, it rejected Dokmanovic's arguments, concluding
that "the means used to accomplish the arrest of Mr. Dokmanovic
neither violated principles of international law nor the sovereignty of
the FRY. ' 248 This precedent will be useful to a permanent interna-
tional criminal court, which may directly or through third parties re-
sort to luring as a method of obtaining custody over offenders present
in non-cooperating states.
D. Assassination of Indicted War Criminals
On July 10, 1997, British IFOR troops shot and killed indicted war
criminal Simo Drjaca, the former police chief in Prijedor, when he
attempted to resist arrest.249 These troops did not shoot to wound the
Serb war lord, but rather brought overwhelming force to bear on this
single lightly armed individual.25 0 Consequently, there has been con-
jecture that the British troops used the international arrest warrant as
an excuse to kill Drjaca, who had become a major impediment to their
mission.251
245. See id. at para. 11.
246. Id. at paras. 16-18.
247. See id. at para. 76.
248. Id. at para. 88.
249. See Berger Press Briefing, supra note 129.
250. See id.
251. Akhavan Interview, supra note 161.
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Targeting civilian leaders has traditionally been viewed as unlawful
"assassination" both in war and non-war contexts. Where an armed
conflict exists between states, international assassination constitutes a
war crime. Article 23(B) of the Hague Convention IV of 1907, pro-
vides that "it is especially forbidden ... to kill or wound treacherously,
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army. '2 52 The United
States Army's field manual on the law of land warfare has incorpo-
rated this prohibition in the following terms: "This article ... prohibits
assassination, proscription or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price
upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy
'dead or alive."253
Yet, the 1907 Hague Convention's prohibition on assassination is
not as broad as it might appear at first blush. Focusing on the "treach-
erous" requirement of the Hague Convention, a recent U.S. military
legal analysis of war time assassination concluded that none of the
following acts contravened the prohibition: (1) the November 18, 1941
raid by Scottish commandos at Bedda Littoria, Libya whose goal was
to kill German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel; (2) the April 18, 1943
downing of a Japanese aircraft known to be carrying Admiral
Osoruku Yamamoto by a U.S. Air Force jet fighter; and (3) the Octo-
ber 30, 1951 air strike by the U.S. Navy that killed 500 senior Chinese
and North Korean military officers and security forces at a military
planning conference at Kapsan, North Korea. 254
Where agents of one state assassinate the official of another state in
a non-war context, the action may constitute an act of terrorism. Arti-
cle 2(a) of the Convention on Internationally Protected Persons, to
which the United States and most other countries are parties,
criminalizes "the intentional commission of... murder, kidnapping or
other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected
person," which are defined to include heads of state and other high
level officials. 255 It is important to note, however, that the Interna-
tionally Protected Persons Convention accords a target protected sta-
252. Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of
Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23(b), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (emphasis added).
253. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger, supra note 122, at 496 n.94.
254. See W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination,
ARMY LAw., Dec. 1989, at 4, 5 (Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-204).
255. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the U.N. on
Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.T.S. 1975, 1037 U.N.T.S. 167.
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tus only when the target of assassination is outside of his/her country's
borders.256
In 1975, President Gerald R. Ford promulgated Executive Order
12,333, which provides "No person employed by or acting on behalf of
the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage
in, assassination. '257 Although Executive Order 12,333 has been reis-
sued by Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton,258 its value is
more symbolic than real. A president can evade the ban posed by the
Executive Order and legally carry out an assassination in four ways:
(1) he can declare the existence of hostilities and target persons in
command positions as combatants; (2) he can broadly construe Article
51 of the U.N. Charter and interpret certain criminal acts as legitimat-
ing assassination as a use of force in self-defense; (3) he can narrowly
construe Executive Order 12,333, for instance, to prohibit only
"treacherous" attacks on foreign leaders; and (4) he can simply repeal
or amend the order, or even approve a one time exception to it.259
The contours of the Executive Order were tested by the 1986 bomb-
ing of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's personal quarters
in Tripoli in response to Libyan involvement in the bombing of the La
Belle Disco in West Berlin. According to investigative reporter Sey-
mour M. Hersh, who spent three months interviewing more than sev-
enty current and former officials in the White House, the State
Department, the Center for Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), the Na-
tional Security Agency, and the Pentagon, Qaddafi's assassination was
the primary goal of the Libyan bombing.260 Hersh reported that nine
of the eighteen American fighter jets that flew to Tripoli on April 14,
1986, had a specific mission to target Qaddafi and his family.261 He
quoted one well-informed Air Force intelligence officer as stating:
"There's no question they were looking for Qaddafi. It was briefed
that way. They were going to kill him. '262 The Reagan administration
characterized the attack as a legitimate self-defense operation under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter in light of evidence that Libya was
256. The Convention defines an "internationally protected person" as a "[h]ead of State, in-
cluding any member of a collegial body performing the functions of a Head of State under the
constitution of the State concerned, a Head of Government or a Minister for Foreign Affairs,
whenever any such person is in a foreign State, as well as members of his family who accompany
him." Id. at art. 1(1)(a).
257. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981).
258. Boyd M. Johnson, Il, Executive Order 12,333: The Permissibility ofan American Assassi-
nation of a Foreign Leader, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 401, 403 (1992).
259. See id. at 417.
260. See Seymour M. Hersh, Target Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 22, 1987, at 17.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 20.
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planning future terrorist attacks against the United States. 263 Shortly
thereafter, Senior Army lawyers made public a memorandum that
concluded that Executive Order 12,333 was not intended to prevent
the United States from acting in self-defense against "legitimate
threats to national security. '264
In accordance with that assessment, during the Persian Gulf War in
1990, Air Force Chief of Staff Michael J. Dugan publicly stated that
the United States had sought to "decapitate" Iraqi leadership by
targeting Saddam Hussein, his family, and even his mistress.265 Nine
years later, the United States specifically targeted Serb President
Slobodan Milosevic's residence during the NATO airstrikes, seeking
to remove the intransigent leader.2 66 In light of these events, an in-
creasing number of scholars have suggested that assassination has be-
come a legitimate preemptive strategy.267 By analogy to the domestic
criminal law concept of "necessity, ' 268 these commentators argue that
assassination can be justified under a balance of harms analysis. 269
Assassination of indicted war criminals might make sense from a
military perspective, and it might induce other indicted war criminals
to turn themselves in. While assassination may achieve a sense of "ac-
263. See President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation (Apr. 14, 1986), in DEP'T ST.
BULL., June 1986, at 1-2.
264. Parks, supra note 254, at 8.
265. See Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would it be a Crime?, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1990, at
Dl.
266. See Paul Richter, Milosevic Not Home As NATO Bombs One of His Residences, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1999, at A34.
267. See Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During Peace and
War, 5 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 231, 240 (1992); Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassi-
nation in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 646 (1992); Turner, supra
note 266, at Dl.
268. See MODEL PENAL COD § 3.02 (1985) (providing that conduct believed necessary to
avoid some harm is justifiable if "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged"); Edward B.
Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose
the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1974).
269. See Beres, supra note 267, at 240. Beres suggests the following prerequisites to an
assassination:
First, a state must make a good faith effort to circumscribe potential targets to include
only those authoritative persons in the prospective attacking state. Second, the assassi-
nation must comply with the settled rules of warfare as they concern discrimination,
proportionality, and military necessity. Third, state-gathered intelligence must evi-
dence, beyond a reasonable doubt, preparations for unconventional or other forms of
highly destructive warfare projected against the acting state. Finally, the state must
have decided after careful deliberation that an assassination would in fact prevent the
intended aggression, and that it would cause substantially less harm to civilian popula-
tions than alternative forms of self-help.
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countability," it is inconsistent with several of the other goals of inter-
national criminal justice, namely achieving truth telling, deterrence,
and reconciliation. Without a living defendant, there can be no pres-
entation of evidence at trial, and therefore no production of a histori-
cal record. Far from deterring acts of violence, assassination is likely
to lead to escalated violence in revenge. In addition to the risk of
retaliation, targeting specific individuals may unintentionally
strengthen enemy morale and resolve. Moreover, the targeted indi-
viduals are likely to be replaced by others who will continue their
threatening policies, thereby frustrating the goal of reconciliation.
E. The Consequences of the Failure to Arrest High Level Indictees
Despite the occasional success of a luring operation, assassination,
or apprehension, the ICTY has not obtained custody over the three
most important indictees-Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic,
Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic, or Serb President
Slobodan Milosevic.
In December 1995, The International Herald Tribunal summarized
the effect of the international indictments on Bosnian Serb leaders
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic as follows:
General Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serbian warrior charged with
the massacre of thousands of Muslim men, now spends much of his
time isolated in a mountain bunker surrounded by a coterie of of-
ficers. His moods are said to swing from rage to uneasy calm. His
partner, Radovan Karadzic, the psychiatrist-turned-politician, had
his political program swept out from under him by the Bosnian
peace accord. Those who have seen him say that his speech is often
slurred, apparently the effect of medication, and his robust physique
has been withered by anxiety as he faces an uncertain future that
includes an indictment for war crimes. This is the picture acquaint-
ances draw of the two men: beaten men desperately dealing to save
their jobs and stay away from the International War Crimes Tribu-
nal at The Hague. 270
Based on this portrayal, Payam Akhavan of the Yugoslavia Tribunal's
Office of the Prosecutor argued that "absent their arrest and surren-
der to the Tribunal, the indictment of political and military leaders,
and the consequent stigmatization, deprivation of liberty, and removal
from public office has had the effect of an interim justice. '271
But in the months to follow, buoyed by the NATO "monitor, don't
touch" policy, Karadzic, Mladic, and their followers would completely
270. Jane Perlez, Karadzic and Mladic: No More Swagger for 2 Losers, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Dec. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
271. Akhavan, The Yugoslavia Tribunal, supra note 27, at 273.
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rebound. Karadzic may have been forced to relinquish his official po-
sition, but like an evil puppet master he retained effective power in
the Republika Srpska to the detriment of a Bosnian peace. As one
human rights monitoring organization concluded, Karadzic "still con-
tinues to exercise complete control over all events in the Republika
Srpska. ' '272 From behind the scenes Karadzic runs the Serb national-
ist-based party known as the SDS, which controls the Republika Srp-
ska's police, court system, media, and major industries. 273 He also
dominates a network of underground Bosnian Serb paramilitary orga-
nizations, whose plans include destabilizing the peace process, creat-
ing opposition to IFOR and international agencies within the Bosnian
Serb population in Republika Srpska, stirring up general animosity
towards the Bosniak-Croat Federation, and destroying any moderate-
line Serb elements. 274
Emboldened by IFOR's inaction against him, "Karadzic has under-
mined virtually every major non-military provision of the Dayton Ac-
cords. ' 275 The first test came in February 1996, when Serb-held
neighborhoods in Sarajevo were transferred to the authority of the
Bosniak-Croat Government. 276 Heeding the calls of Karadzic, the
Serbs burned down their homes and fled rather than remain in an
ethnically mixed neighborhood. Then in September 1996, Karadzic
derailed the possibility of a credible voter registration process, leading
to the postponement of municipal elections. 277
For this reason, the newly appointed United Nations High Repre-
sentative for Bosnia has said: "As long as [the major indicted war
criminals] are at large, there is not going to be a normal life in Bosnia,
not only for rule of law reasons but also because of their influence in
politics and economy in the country. . . . They have to go to The
Hague. ' 278 Echoing this sentiment, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi An-
nan stated: "Indicted war criminals are having far too much influence
on developments, particularly in the Republika Srpska, to be left at
large." 279
272. Bosnia-Hercegovina: The Continuing Influence of Bosnia's Warlords, HUM. Rirs. WATCH,
Dec. 1996.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Orentlicher, supra note 172. at 716.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. John Pomfret & Lee Hockstader, In Bosnia, a War Crimes Impasse NATO Differences
With U.N. Tribunal Mean Few Are Arrested, WASH. POsT, Dec. 9, 1997, at A17.
279. Reuters, Sept. 1, 1997.
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Calling for NATO to take action in particular to arrest Radovan
Karadzic, Deputy High Representative Jacques Klein has stated:
"Karadzic's presence still casts a cloud over what we do and it would
be nice to have the political will to do what needs to be done because
it poisons the atmosphere. ' 280 Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy was even more blunt in his assessment: "Without firm ac-
tion on war crimes, reconciliation is doomed. ' 281 And without recon-
ciliation, the NATO force will either be forced to remain in Bosnia
indefinitely, or war will break out as it withdraws. As a Senior NATO
official acknowledged, "[u]nless Karadzic and other war criminals are
captured before our peacekeepers go home, there is a good chance
that the war could return and all our good efforts would be in vain. '28 2
In addition to damaging the goal of peace-building in Bosnia, the
failure to make arrests has eroded any deterrent value the Yugoslavia
Tribunal might have had. Notwithstanding Akhavan's theory of "in-
terim justice," international indictments alone have little value if they
are not backed up with an expectation of consequences. While critics
of the Tribunal point to the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 and ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo in 1998-1999 as evidence that the existence of the
Tribunal had no deterrent effect, the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Prosecutor
counters that the lack of deterrence is due to the failure of NATO to
make arrests in Bosnia.283 In addition to deterrence in the former Yu-
goslavia, Goldstone believes "the failure to make arrests also risks de-
stroying the broader deterrent value of the Tribunal. Future tyrants
will be given notice that they also have nothing to fear from interna-
tional justice for as long as they are surrounded by armed guards. '284
Finally, the failure to arrest has undermined the credibility of both
NATO and the ICTY. Just as the "craven acquiescence" in ethnic
cleansing by the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia deeply
compromised the credibility of the United Nations, a continuing fail-
ure to arrest indicted war criminals has made NATO appear weak,
and has diminished the credibility of the Tribunal as a mechanism for
justice.285 In response, the President of the Tribunal, Judge Antonio
280. Deputy High Representative Jacques Klein, Reuters, Nov. 22. 1998.
281. Fred Barbash, Conference Hints Cutoff of Aid to Bosnian Rivals; Serbs Considered Main
Target of London Warning, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1996, at A39.
282. William Drozdiak, NATO Chiefs Block Call for Pursuit of War Criminals, WASH. PosT,
June 13, 1997, at A36.
283. Joint Press Conference of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Justice Louise Ar-
bour, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Washington, D.C., Apr. 30,
1999.
284. Richard Goldstone, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Responsibility to Act, INTER PRESS SERV..
June 27, 1996, available at 1996 WL 10767854.
285. See Orentlicher, supra note 172, at 715.
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Cassese, gave the Western States an ultimatum in 1996: either they
take more aggressive actions to arrest leaders indicted for crimes
against humanity in Bosnia, or he and his fellow judges "will propose
to the Security Council to close down the Tribunal [because it] is be-
coming an exercise in hypocrisy. '2 86 Although the series of arrests
conducted by NATO forces in 1997 staved off this threat, the handful
of arrests of low-level indictees is but a bandaid to the Tribunal's
hemorrhaging credibility.
After Slobodan Milosevic was indicted by the ICTY on May 24,
1999 for crimes against humanity in Kosovo, the United States an-
nounced that it would make no effort to forcibly take him into cus-
tody.287 Unlike in Bosnia, where NATO troops patrol areas in which
the indicted war criminals reside, there is no authorized NATO pres-
ence in Serbia other than in the province of Kosovo. Furthermore, as
long as Milosevic remains in power, and is protected by the Yugoslav
police and military, it would be extraordinarily difficult to launch a
successful snatch operation without massive casualties. For now, his
punishment is to become a prisoner within the borders of Serbia. The
indictment has made him a pariah abroad and has undermined his
support at home. But until he is brought to justice at The Hague, he is
likely to remain a threat to the region.
VI. CONCLUSION
Like the ICTY, the inherent weakness of the ICC will be the need
often to rely on the voluntary cooperation of the very governments
whose officials and personnel it seeks to prosecute. In the absence of
voluntary cooperation, the international community has generated an
impressive arsenal of indirect enforcement mechanisms for the ICTY,
which are potentially of great use to the ICC. As detailed above,
these include condemnation by the Assembly of State Parties or the
U.N. Security Council; offers of individual cash rewards for assistance
in locating and apprehending indicted war criminals; use of luring to
obtain custody over indicted war criminals by deception; freezing the
assets of indicted war criminals; offers of economic incentives to gov-
ernments to induce cooperation; imposition of diplomatic and eco-
nomic sanctions on non-cooperating governments; and use of military
force to effectuate apprehension.
286. See Robert Marquand, Bosnia War Crimes Judge Talks of Quitting, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MON., Oct. 22, 1996, at 1.
287. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Interview on Fox News, Washington, D.C.
(May 28, 1999).
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Yet, owing to a lack of political will and divergent interests of key
states, the international community has to date not sufficiently em-
ployed these enforcement tools, prompting the ICTY to warn the
U.N. General Assembly that "[t]he potential benefits of the Tribunal's
work can not be realized until the international community demon-
strates the same commitment to empower the Tribunal as it had
shown when it established it. ' '288 The ICTY has struggled with fund-
ing, with lack of support from the U.N. Security Council, and above
all with arrests.
As a result, seven years after its establishment, the ICTY still has
not obtained custody over the major war criminals most responsible
for the Balkan atrocities. The failure to bring these indicted leaders to
justice has severely damaged the goal of peace-building in the former
Yugoslavia, subverted the credibility of the ICTY, and undermined
any deterrent value the ICTY might have had both in the former Yu-
goslavia and around the world.
Given the impressive array of enforcement mechanisms which have
been employed in connection with the ICTY, one might have high
hopes for the success of the ICC. Yet, in light of the ICTY's limited
success with these mechanisms, one must temper those hopes with
modest expectations. In the end, the ICC will succeed only where in-
ternational justice and power can be brought together.
288. Fifth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Respon-
sible for Serious Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., at para. 276, U.N. Doc. S/1998/737
(1998).
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